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DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF FINANCIAL ILLITERACY 
Jill E. Fisch† Annamaria Lusardi‡ & Andrea Hasler†† 
Retirement investing in the United States has changed 
dramatically.  The classic defined benefit (DB) plan has 
largely been replaced by the defined contribution (DC) plan. 
With the latter, individual employees’ decisions about how 
much to save for retirement and how to invest those savings 
determine the benefits available upon retirement. 
We analyze data from the 2015 National Financial Capa-
bility Study to show that people whose only exposure to in-
vestment decisions is by virtue of their participation in an 
employer-sponsored 401(k) plan are poorly equipped to make 
sound investment decisions.  Specifically, they suffer from 
higher levels of financial illiteracy than other investors.  This 
lack of financial literacy is critical because of both the financial 
consequences of poor financial decisions and a legal structure 
that relies on participant choice to limit the fiduciary obliga-
tions of the employer with respect to the structure and options 
provided by the retirement plan. 
In response to this concern, we propose mandated em-
ployer-provided financial education to address limited em-
ployee financial literacy.  We identify and discuss three 
requirements that a financial education program should incor-
porate—a self-assessment, minimum substantive compo-
nents, and timing.  Formalizing the employer role in evaluating 
and increasing financial literacy among plan participants is a 
key step in providing retirement plan participants with the 
resources necessary to manage important decisions regarding 
retirement planning and, ultimately, for enhancing the finan-
cial security of American workers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Retirement investing in the United States has changed dra-
matically.  The classic pension plan, also known as a defined 
benefit plan, in which an employer paid a retired employee a 
fixed monthly benefit, is largely extinct.1  Instead, employers 
have overwhelmingly switched to defined contribution plans, 
commonly known as 401(k) plans, in which an individual em-
ployee’s decisions about how much to save for retirement and 
how to invest that savings determine the benefits that the em-
ployee will have available upon retirement.2 
The challenge with this system is that U.S. employees are 
poorly equipped to make decisions about how to invest for re-
tirement.  Retirement investing is complicated, the typical 
401(k) plan offers participants products that many of them do 
not understand, and retirement saving is most effective when 
people begin saving early.  In addition to the initial decisions, 
effective retirement investing requires plan participants to eval-
uate whether to make changes to their portfolios over the 
1 See David E. Morse, Are Pension Plans Headed for Extinction?, 15 BENEFITS 
L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (describing the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans after the adoption of ERISA and the creation of the 401(k) plan). 
2 The 401(k) plan is the product of changes made to the Internal Revenue 
Code by the Revenue Act of 1978 that shield retirement savings from federal 
income taxes.  Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763, 
2785 (1978) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k) (2012)). 
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course of their career and, when they retire, to determine how 
to manage the balance in their accounts to provide income for 
the rest of their lives.3 
The complexity of appropriate retirement investing is com-
pounded by the fact that financial literacy rates in the general 
population are low.4  People with low financial literacy are sus-
ceptible to a variety of investment mistakes, including choosing 
products that do not meet their needs and paying excessive 
fees.5  In addition, studies have shown that people who score 
lower in terms of financial literacy are less likely to plan for 
retirement, leaving those who are most in need of retirement 
planning most at risk.6 
Although financial illiteracy is a widespread problem, the 
evolution of workplace retirement investing exacerbates the 
problem by imposing responsibility for financial well-being in 
retirement on a group of people who are particularly ill-suited 
for the task.  We term these people “workplace-only investors,” 
which we define as people whose only exposure to investment 
decisions is by virtue of their participation in an employer-
sponsored 401(k) plan or the equivalent.  We view workplace-
only investors as forced or involuntary investors in that their 
participation in the financial markets is a product of their em-
ployment and unlikely the result of informed choice. 
This Article presents the first research that focuses specifi-
cally on the financial literacy of workplace-only investors.  As 
we document, data from the National Financial Capability 
Study (NFCS) demonstrates that workplace-only investors suf-
fer from higher levels of financial illiteracy than other investors. 
These involuntary investors are particularly vulnerable to poor 
financial choices, choices that they would likely avoid but for 
the obligations imposed on them by the structure of their re-
tirement plans.  This lack of financial literacy is critical.  Al-
3 See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance 
of Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 24–26 (2014) (dis-
cussing how “[retirees] must forecast their (and their partner’s) survival probabili-
ties, investment returns, pension income, and medical and other expenditures.”). 
4 See id. at 6, 34 (defining financial literacy as “peoples’ ability to process 
economic information and make informed decisions about financial planning, 
wealth accumulation, debt, and pensions” and concluding that “low levels of 
financial knowledge are pervasive.”). 
5 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Kristin Firth, The Knowledge 
Gap in Workplace Retirement Investing and the Role of Professional Advisors, 66 
DUKE L.J. 633, 671 (2016) (finding that “financial literacy is a strong predictor of 
investment outcomes”). 
6 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement 
Planning in the United States, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 509, 518 (2011). 
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though the typical 401(k) plan requires workplace-only 
investors to take primary responsibility in making investment 
decisions for their own retirement, as we show, they lack the 
knowledge necessary to do so appropriately. 
This is not to criticize the shift from defined benefit plans to 
defined contribution plans.  As we detail below, defined benefit 
plans suffered from a variety of problems, the most acute of 
which were chronic underfunding7 and the fact that partici-
pants in defined benefit plans risked losing their benefits if they 
changed employers.8  Defined benefit plans are a big impedi-
ment to labor mobility, because many workers change jobs 
frequently.  Defined contribution plans mitigate these 
problems.  They do so, however, by imposing primary responsi-
bility on plan participants for making critical decisions about 
retirement investing, without adequately addressing the lim-
ited ability of participants to do so. 
The problem of financial illiteracy of plan participants is 
compounded by the fact that the existing regulatory treatment 
of defined contribution plans uses the construct of participant 
choice as a basis for imposing limited responsibility on employ-
ers for the financial well-being of their employees in connection 
with retirement investing.9  So long as an employer-sponsored 
defined contribution plan delegates investment responsibility 
to plan participants in accordance with Department of Labor 
(DOL) regulations and meets certain minimal criteria, the em-
ployer is relieved of fiduciary responsibility for investment 
losses suffered by its employees.10 
Concededly, participant choice does not shield an em-
ployer from all potential liability.  Employers have consistently 
faced litigation challenges for failure to offer their employees an 
appropriate retirement plan,11 and, even in the absence of liti-
gation, many employers have sought to review and refine their 
retirement plans.12  Critically, however, the law does not im-
pose any obligation on employers to ensure that their employ-
ees have sufficient financial literacy to navigate the decisions 
7 See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
9 See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2011) (“An 
ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants meaningful 
choices . . . .”). 
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that plan fiduciaries are not 
responsible for losses which result from participants’ exercise of control). 
11 See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Revenue Sharing in 401(k) Plans: Employers as 
Monitors?, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 485, 504–05 (2014) (describing typical litigation). 
12 See id. at 505–06. 
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associated with retirement investing appropriately or to safe-
guard them from poor financial decisions resulting from finan-
cial illiteracy.  Our findings suggest that such obligations are 
long overdue. 
Congress is continuing to try to make self-directed retire-
ment savings more effective.  For example, the Retirement En-
hancement and Savings Act (RESA) was originally introduced 
into Congress in 2018 and was reintroduced in February 2019 
before the Ways and Means Committee.13  The proposals in 
RESA continue to rely on participant choice, however, which, 
as we detail below, are of limited utility unless participants can 
choose knowledgeably. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, the Article briefly 
traces the progression from defined benefit plans to defined 
contribution plans and explains the manner in which this pro-
gression has changed the role of the plan participant.  Part II 
describes the legal standards applicable to an employer in con-
nection with their 401(k) plan.  In Part III, the Article reports 
our findings that people who invest exclusively through an em-
ployer-sponsored 401(k) plan are less financially literate than 
other investors and their personal finances are also quite dif-
ferent than other investors.  Part IV considers the implications 
of this finding for the viability of participant-directed retirement 
savings.  In Part V, we identify two potential responses.  One 
possibility is that ERISA could be modified to impose greater 
responsibility on plan sponsors.  We identify limitations in the 
viability of this option, as well as the risk that it would decrease 
employer willingness to provide retirement plans for their 
workers.  Alternatively, employer-sponsors of participant-di-
rected 401(k) plans could be required to evaluate and remedi-
ate the financial literacy of plan participants, thereby 
enhancing the effectiveness of participant choice.  After dis-
cussing both, we suggest that the second alternative is the 
more promising and offer preliminary reflections on how em-
ployers could do so effectively. 
13 Retirement Enhancement and Savings Act of 2018, H.R. 5282, 115th 
Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5282/ 
text#toc-H1077D5B691CE4439BF378EADF2E8581B [https://perma.cc/C7QS-
MRGJ]. 
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I 
THE EVOLUTION OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 
For decades, workers relied on employer-provided pension 
plans for financial support in retirement.14  Employer-spon-
sored retirement savings plans began with the classic pension 
plan, also known as a defined benefit plan, and the state and 
local governments provided the first such plans to public sector 
workers in the mid-1800s.15  In 1875, the American Express 
Company created the first private sector pension plan in the 
United States.16  Over the next fifty years, the popularity of 
private pension plans increased, and by 1925 more than 400 
plans existed in the United States, covering more than four 
million workers.17  Following the Great Depression, private 
pension plans continued to increase, fueled by tax incentives, 
the strong demand for labor following World War II, and union 
negotiations.18  Pension coverage increased to over 40% in the 
1940s and ’50s, and pension assets increased from $2.4 billion 
to $57 billion in twenty years.19 
These early public and private sector pension plans were 
defined benefit plans meaning that they paid a retired em-
ployee a fixed monthly amount after retirement.  The em-
ployee’s benefit (the defined benefit) was typically calculated 
based on the employee’s salary when he or she retired and the 
length of service.20  In part, the structure of the pension plan 
was designed to facilitate employee retention through a payout 
structure that encouraged workers to stay with the same em-
ployer until retirement.21  This meant that, in many cases, de-
fined benefit plans were not portable and, as a result, workers 
often forfeited benefits when they changed jobs. Because job 
14 See Liz Davidson, The History of Retirement Benefits, WORKFORCE (June 21, 
2016), https://www.workforce.com/2016/06/21/the-history-of-retirement-bene 
fits/ [https://perma.cc/S3CS-N3E4]. 
15 Id.  See also ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK W. WILSON, A HISTORY OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (2003). 
16 Davidson, supra note 14; JUSTIN OWENS & JOSHUA BARBASH, RUSSELL INVEST-
MENTS RESEARCH, DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS: A BRIEF HISTORY 2 (2014), https://russell 
investments.com/-/media/files/us/insights/institutions/defined-benefit/de 
fined-benefit-plans-a-brief-history.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/62ES-GXHR]. 
17 OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Id. 
20 See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Pri-
macy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 922 (2013). 
Id. 21 
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mobility was increasing, lack of portability was a growing 
problem.22 
In a defined benefit plan, “[t]he employer is responsible for 
funding the benefit, investing and managing plan assets, and 
bearing the investment risk.”23  To fund defined benefit plans, 
employers typically pay money into their plans every year.  The 
plan invests that money in a variety of assets such as stocks 
and bonds.24  The expectation is that the plan’s assets would 
grow and be sufficient to meet the plan’s obligations.  This ex-
pectation was often not met, for a variety of reasons.  Many 
plans were underfunded.25  Others invested in overly risky as-
sets—it was common for plans to be funded largely in the em-
ployer’s stock.26  Employers also faced increasing liability due 
to their employees’ increasing longevity.27  And, as one com-
mentator notes “embezzlement of plan assets was not uncom-
mon.”28  Defined benefit plans were also criticized for the size of 
the benefits that they paid out.  In an era of economic growth, 
22 See Alexandra Lopez-Pacheco, How We Got Here: The Gradual Rise of the 
Defined Contribution Pension, FIN. POST (Dec. 6, 2012, 7:52 PM), http://business. 
financialpost.com/executive/how-we-got-here-the-gradual-rise-of-the-defined-
contribution-pension [https://perma.cc/2R7G-BWC5] (describing the lack of 
portability of defined benefit plans). 
23 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-176T, PRIVATE PENSIONS: CHANG-
ING  FUNDING  RULES AND  ENHANCING  INCENTIVES  CAN  IMPROVE  PLAN  FUNDING 1 n.1 
(2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04176t.pdf. [https://perma.cc/93JE-
ANQC]. 
24 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, Lessons from Efforts to Manage the Shift of 
Pensions to Defined Contribution Plans in the United States, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 315, 317 (2016) (“Normally, defined benefit 
pension plans invest in a variety of assets, although a large percentage of them are 
invested in financial products such as stocks, bonds, commodities, and 
derivatives.”). 
25 See Lopez-Pacheco, supra note 22 (explaining that many defined benefit 
plans became underfunded as interest rates dropped); see also U.S. GOV’T  AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 23, at 1 (describing pension underfunding as “a 
crucial issue threatening the retirement security of millions of America’s workers 
and retirees”). 
26 The trend to fund employee retirement with the employer’s stock continued 
after the shift to defined contribution plans. See, e.g., Gelter, supra note 20, at 
928 (noting that “before the market downturn in 2001, in a number of large 
firms—including Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola, and General Electric—more than 
75% of 401(k) plan assets consisted of company stock.”).  Gelter also notes that 
“firms may have good reasons to encourage employees to invest their retirement 
assets with them.” Id. 
27 See Brown, supra note 24, at 317 (explaining that employers under a 
defined benefit plan face the risk that employees may live longer than expected, so 
that the pension plan funds may not be sufficient to cover the pension 
obligations). 
28 OWENS & BARBASH, supra note 16, at 3. 
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some commentators questioned whether workers were receiv-
ing as much as they should receive.29 
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (ERISA) in 1974 to respond, in part, to the concerns 
about employer-provided pension plans.30  ERISA focused on 
improving the security of employees’ pension benefits.  Perhaps 
the most significant component of ERISA, at least in the short 
term, was its minimum funding requirement for defined benefit 
plans.31  ERISA also imposed fiduciary obligations on employer 
and others involved in managing a pension plan.32  In addition, 
ERISA imposed various rules on the structure of pension 
plans, including vesting and participation requirements.33 
The adoption of ERISA created the greatest regulatory bur-
den for employers that provided a defined benefit plans be-
cause, under ERISA, the plan’s fiduciaries were “responsible 
for investing the assets of the plan to ensure that there will be 
enough money to meet future obligations to plan partici-
pants.”34  This meant that, if an employer underfunded its plan 
or made poor investment decisions so that the plan did not 
have enough assets to pay the required benefits, the employer 
was responsible for the shortfall.  One way for employers to 
avoid their pension liability was by declaring bankruptcy, and 
mounting pension obligations led a number of major employers 
to do so.35 
Employers can reduce their liability exposure by shifting to 
defined contribution plans.36  In a defined contribution plan, 
individual employees contribute a portion of their wages, deter-
29 See Lopez-Pacheco, supra note 22 (reporting concern during “days of high 
interest rates” that defined benefit plans were causing employees to miss out on 
high returns). 
30 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 and in scattered 
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.). 
31 See Gelter, supra note 20, at 929 (“DB plans were subjected to minimum 
funding rules, given that DB plans had previously often been woefully 
underfunded.”). 
32 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2018). 
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052–53. 
34 James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 15 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 483, 507 (2013). 
35 See id. at 520 (explaining that employer-sponsored pension plan’s bank-
ruptcy would shift pension obligations to taxpayers); see, e.g., Jonathan Barry 
Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine Pensions, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 802 n.174 
(2015) (noting that City of Detroit went bankrupt largely due to pension debts). 
36 See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the 
Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 167 (2013) (explaining that 
“[r]egulatory burdens on defined benefit plans unintentionally created incentives 
for employer sponsors to shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution 
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mined in advance, to the retirement plan.37  Each employee’s 
individual contributions go to an individual account and are 
invested, and the return on these contributions determines the 
amount of money available to the employee upon retirement. 
In some cases, the employer matches all or a portion of the 
employee’s contribution.38  Because the contributions are seg-
regated from the outset, unlike in a defined benefit plan, the 
security of the employee’s retirement savings is not jeopardized 
by the employer’s financial condition. 
Although employers can, in theory, manage the investment 
of their employees’ contributions in a defined contribution 
plan, as a matter of practice, they do not do so.39  Instead, 
employers offer their employees a menu of investment choices, 
and individual plan participants designate how their money is 
to be invested from among those choices.  Because the employ-
ees, not the employer, decide both how much to invest and how 
to invest their contributions, these plans are described as self-
or participant-directed.40  Participant-directed plans substan-
tially reduce the employer’s liability exposure because, so long 
as the employer complies with the requirements of section 
404(c) of ERISA, the statute provides a safe harbor or liability 
shield from losses suffered by plan participants,41 even in situ-
ations in which the employer has arguably breached its du-
ties.42  The three requirements for the safe harbor are (1) that 
the plan offer participant control; (2) that the participant actu-
ally exercise control and (3) that the losses result from the 
participant’s exercise of control.43 
plans to avoid the additional costs and liabilities associated with pension funding 
responsibilities”). 
37 See Edward A. Zelinksy, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 
451, 457 (2004) (explaining that defined contribution plans work like individual 
accounts in which the employees’ benefits are determined by their contributions 
and investment decisions). 
38 See, e.g., Ryan Bubb, Patrick Corrigan & Patrick L. Warren, A Behavioral 
Contract Theory Perspective on Retirement Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1346 
(2015) (exploring employer incentives with respect to matching employee plan 
contributions). 
39 See, e.g., Forman & Sabin, supra note 35, at 806 (explaining that, although 
employers could, in theory, manage their employees’ investments in a defined 
contribution plan, “we know of no defined contribution plans like that”). 
40 See, e.g., Zelinksy, supra note 37, at 457 (calling defined contribution 
assets “self-directed” because the employee has control over the investments). 
41 ERISA § 404; 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012) (stipulating that neither the par-
ticipant nor anyone else is a fiduciary for a retirement account over which the 
participant exercises control). 
42 DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 758, 775 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
43 See Tucker, supra note 36, at 204 (describing the requirements of section 
404(c)). 
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The ERISA safe harbor does not provide employers with a 
complete liability shield.  Employers may be liable for providing 
a plan that is structured inappropriately, such as one with an 
insufficient range of investment options,44 unsuitable invest-
ment options, or that charges excessive fees.  However, courts 
have granted plan fiduciaries significant discretion with re-
spect to their choices about plan structure and investment 
options.45  Litigation asserting these claims is relatively com-
mon and will be discussed in more detail below.  Despite this 
litigation, an employer faces far more limited liability exposure 
in connection with a defined contribution plan.  In addition to 
reduced liability exposure, defined contribution plans are less 
costly for employers and are subject to less burdensome regu-
latory requirements.46 
These factors have led most employers to shift from offering 
defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans and, in 
some cases, to convert existing defined benefit plans to defined 
contribution plans.47  From 1983 to 1993, the number of de-
fined contribution plans increased more than fivefold.48  Today 
most private employers and even many public employers have 
shifted to the defined contribution plan.49 
44 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(3)(ii)(C) (2015) (requiring a minimum of 
three investment options for retirement plans). 
45 See Tucker, supra note 36, at 205–06. 
46 See, e.g., Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution 
Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 614–15 (2000) (describing defined benefit plans as 
subject to “more onerous regulations” and greater costs and administrative 
burdens). 
47 Tucker, supra note 36, at 205 (observing that the “safe harbor and discre-
tionary deference create incentives for employer sponsors to (1) provide or convert 
existing pension benefits into a self-directed defined contribution model”). 
48 Leora Friedberg & Michael T. Owyang, Not Your Father’s Pension Plan: The 
Rise of 401(k) and Other Defined Contribution Plans, 84 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS 
REV. 22, 23 (Jan./Feb. 2002), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publica 
tions/review/02/01/23-34Friedberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9H4-579G]. 
49 See, e.g., NEWPORT GROUP, COMPENSATION, RETIREMENT, AND BENEFITS TRENDS 
REPORT 12 (2017/2018 ed.), https://www.newportgroup.com/newportgroup/me 
dia/documents/c202b-112717-2017-2018-edition-compensation-retirement-
and-benefits-trends-executive-summary-(002)_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7H3-
VSU6] (reporting results of 2017–2018 in which 91% of private employers re-
ported offering a defined contribution plan while only 11% reported offering a 
defined benefit plan, either alone or in combination with a defined contribution 
plan); Jerry Geisel, Fortune 500 Continues to Shed Pension Plans, BUS. INS. (Feb. 
22, 2016), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160222/NEWS03/ 
160229986 [https://perma.cc/G6DZ-YYFV] (documenting decline in percentage 
of Fortune 500 companies offering defined benefit plans from 58% in 1998 to less 
than 20% in 2015).  Although a majority of public sector employees still partici-
pate in defined benefit plans, most of those plans are not open to new employees. 
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THREE QUARTERS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
WORKERS WERE IN DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS IN 2016 (May 3, 2017), https:// 
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Significantly, the shift to defined contribution plans re-
duced the number of employees who participated in employer-
based retirement plans because it allowed individual employ-
ees to choose not to participate.50  In response to this concern 
as well as literature suggesting that enrollments would be 
higher under a system in which employees were automatically 
enrolled in their employer’s plan and then had to take action to 
opt out, if they chose,51 Congress adopted the Pension Protec-
tion Act (PPA) of 2006.52  The PPA made automatic enrollment 
in defined contribution plans easier and clarified the em-
ployer’s obligations with respect to auto-enrollment.53  In par-
ticular, the PPA authorized employers that adopted auto-
enrollment to invest employees’ contributions in a qualified 
default investment alternative, which was defined by the stat-
ute as either (1) “diversified so as to minimize the risk of large 
losses” and “designed to provide . . . a mix of equity and fixed 
income exposures based on the participant’s age, target retire-
ment date (such as normal retirement age under the plan) or 
life expectancy,” or (2) “consistent with a target level of risk 
appropriate for participants of the plan as a whole.”54  Tradi-
tional target date funds and balanced funds are commonly 
used as default options.55 
The response to the PPA was significant—as of 2012, ap-
proximately 40% of Fortune 100 companies in the United 
States had implemented auto-enrollment, and participation 
www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/three-quarters-of-state-and-local-government-
workers-were-in-defined-benefit-pension-plans-in-2016.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
EX8H-556B]. 
50 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Case for Paternalistic 
Workplace Retirement Plans, 91 IND. L.J. 505, 516 (2016) (describing a “massive 
retirement crisis” caused by defined contribution plans and identifying failure of 
workers to participate in such plans as one contributing factor). 
51 See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary 
Obligation in Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2013) (explain-
ing that whether the plan default is participation or non-participation “dramati-
cally affects participation rates”). 
52 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 821–33, 901–06, 
120 Stat. 780, 782–83 (2006); see Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelli-
gence and Control: Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 51 (2015) (“The PPA’s strategy was inspired by academic 
studies that showed huge increases in enrollment when companies switched to 
auto-enrolling employees, who could then choose to opt out, in 401(k) plans.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
53 Auto-enrollment had previously been permissible, and IRS revenue rulings 
in 1998 and 2000 facilitated its use. See Brown, supra note 24, at 330. 
54 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2009). 
55 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of 
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1516 
(2015). 
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rates rose at employers that shifted to auto-enrollment.56  Ac-
cording to a 2018 Willis Towers Watson survey, the percentage 
of employers using auto-enrollment has grown to 73%.57  One 
study found that participation rates among new hires more 
than doubled under automatic enrollment versus voluntary 
enrollment.58 
The overall effectiveness of auto-enrollment may have been 
overstated. While automatic enrollment has clearly increased 
enrollment into retirement accounts, it is much less clear if it 
has increased net savings or employee’s wellbeing.  Recent cen-
sus data suggests that employee participation rates may be 
much lower than previously thought, particularly at smaller 
employers.59  Research has identified the fact that the em-
ployer-selected default rate is “sticky,” meaning that most em-
ployees do not deviate from the savings rate set by their 
employer, which has been normally quite low.60  This can lead 
to low overall savings levels.61  These rates are particularly 
problematic to the extent that plan participants view the em-
ployer-selected rate as a benchmark and assume that saving at 
that rate will be sufficient to meet their retirement needs.62 
56 Susan Farris et al., Defined Contribution Plans of Fortune 100 Companies 
for the 2012 Plan Year, TOWERS  WATSON: INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2014), https:// 
www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/insider/2014/ 
defined-contribution-plans-of-fortune-100-companies-in-2012 [https:// 
perma.cc/Y5NF-H2JZ]. 
57 Paula Aven Gladych, Employers Adding 401(k) Auto-Enrollment in Record 
Numbers, EMP. BENEFIT  NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.benefitnews.com/ 
news/employers-adding-401-k-auto-enrollment-in-record-numbers?regconf=1 
[https://perma.cc/U2UQ-K9U8]. 
58 Jeffrey W. Clark, Stephen P. Utkus & Jean A. Young, Automatic Enrollment: 
The Power of the Default, VANGUARD 1, 4 (2015), https://pressroom.vanguard. 
com/nonindexed/Automatic_enrollment_power_of_default_1.15.2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V975-9N3L]. 
59 See, e.g., Dan Kadlec, A Popular Cure for the Retirement Crisis Isn’t Making 
Much Headway, MONEY (Mar. 9, 2017), http://time.com/money/4693386/401k-
auto-enrollment-retirement-saving/ [https://perma.cc/9BFP-D4JX] (reporting 
that “[s]ome 79% of Americans are eligible to contribute to a 401(k) but only 41% 
of eligible workers do so”). 
60 Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails 
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1618 (2014). 
61 See Kelley Holland, The Downside of Automatic 401(k) Enrollment, CNBC 
(June 29, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/29/the-downside-of-auto-
matic-401k-enrollment.html [https://perma.cc/UM2E-PWJB] (reporting that au-
tomatic enrollment increased employee participation but reduced contribution 
levels). 
62 See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Par-
ticipants, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 81–82 (2002) (explaining that more than half of 
employees automatically enrolled may never adjust the default contribution rate). 
Participants may also take cues from the structure of their employer’s match 
formula in determining what an appropriate savings level is. See also Stephen 
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Another problem is that, if employer-selected rates are too 
high and/or employees’ precautionary savings are minimal, 
employees may offset the savings by increasing their levels of 
debt.  One recent paper studied the shift by the U.S. Army to 
automatic enrollment in its Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) and found 
evidence of this effect.  The research showed that “a significant 
portion of the increase in TSP contributions induced by auto-
matic enrollment is offset by increased debt outside the TSP.”63 
This effect is not surprising given the evidence about house-
hold debt, the prevalence of debt in many household balance 
sheets, and the paucity of precautionary savings.64  The recent 
government shutdown provided acute evidence about the lack 
of emergency savings among those with government jobs, 
which normally carry good pension benefits.65 
More generally, one size does not fit all.  Both the em-
ployer’s selection of a savings rate and a choice of investment 
for the employees’ savings raise potential problems because 
employees vary in their age, outside savings, income, debt obli-
gations, and funding needs when they retire.  There is no way 
that an employer can designate a default rate or investment 
option that is right for everyone.  But employees typically lack 
any basis by which to evaluate whether the employer’s default 
choices are appropriate for them and stick to what is chosen for 
them. 
The most recent adaption to the problem of savings rates 
that are too low is auto-escalation.  Recognizing that the initial 
Miller, Auto Escalation Beats Inertia, So Why the Hesitancy?, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. 
MGMT. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/bene 
fits/pages/auto-escalation-hesitancy.aspx [https://perma.cc/UP32-WVYJ]. The 
concern may be exacerbated by the extent to which employers focus on participa-
tion rates rather than evaluating whether their employees are saving enough for 
retirement. See, e.g., Gladych, supra note 57 (reporting that while 88% of plans 
sponsors measure participation rates, only 35% measure the retirement readi-
ness of their participants). 
63 John Beshears et al., Borrowing to Save? Unintended Consequences of 
Automatic Enrollment 1, 11 (Feb. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/total_savings_impact_2017_12_06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89ZT-NUSC]. 
64 See Emmie Martin, The Government Shutdown Highlights How Few Ameri-
cans Have Enough Money Saved for Emergencies, CNBC MAKE IT (Jan. 16, 2019, 
8:45 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/15/government-shutdown-high-
lights-how-few-americans-have-emergency-savings.html [https://perma.cc/ 
X53K-8B5G] (discussing the widespread lack of emergency savings in American 
households); infra Table 4a (detailing the prevalence of debt in American 
households). 
65 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 64 (reporting that the 2019 government shut-
down forced some federal workers to “rely on credit cards” or donations due to a 
temporary loss of income). 
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default savings rates common to auto-enrollment may be too 
low, some employers are adopting plans in which the partici-
pants’ default contribution increases automatically.66  A num-
ber of commentators have cited the benefits of auto-escalation, 
but employers have been somewhat hesitant to adopt this fea-
ture.67  Yet again, this feature fails to take into account that 
workers may have different needs and that they change em-
ployers often. 
Use of auto-enrollment and other features to increase em-
ployee retirement savings beyond the initial enrollment deci-
sion has become more popular as prominent employers have 
taken the lead.68  For example, in 2017, American Express an-
nounced that it had adopted an auto-enrollment plan with 
auto-escalation for all new employees.  American Express also 
communicates at least once annually with all its employees 
who are not enrolled in the plan or who invest less than the full 
amount that is matched by the company.69  As we discuss in 
more detail below, automatic enrollment and automatic escala-
tion may work well in an environment in which employees stay 
with a single firm for a long time, but this feature is not com-
mon anymore in the workplace and was a factor contributing to 
the shift toward defined contribution pension plans. 
II 
FIDUCIARY LIABILITY FOR 401(K) PLANS 
ERISA is premised on a fiduciary framework.  Employers 
and plan administrators are subject to various fiduciary obliga-
tions, including a duty to select and monitor the plan’s invest-
ment options70 and a duty to refrain from conflicts of interest 
and self-dealing in connection with the administration of the 
plan.71  As noted above, so long as participants exercise mean-
66 See Marlene Y. Satter, Auto-Enroll, Escalation Features on Rise in 401(k)s 
as Employers Add Enhancements, BENEFITSPRO (Feb. 27, 2018, 11:39 AM), 
https://www.benefitspro.com/2018/02/27/auto-enroll-escalation-features-on-
rise-in-401ks-a/ [https://perma.cc/KAB8-8PCC]. 
67 See e.g., Miller, supra note 62 (arguing that auto-escalation has substan-
tial benefits despite employer hesitancy). 
68 See Robert Steyer, American Express Starts Auto Enrollment in 401(k) for 
New Employees, PENSIONS & INV. (July 13, 2017, 1:00 AM), http://www.pionline. 
com/article/20170713/ONLINE/170719886/american-express-starts-auto-en-
rollment-in-401k-for-new-employees [https://perma.cc/9YLM-Q8M3] (reporting 
that American Express adopted auto-enrollment and auto-escalation features); 
Satter, supra note 66 (reporting that 60% of employee retirement plans now offer 
an auto-escalation feature). 
69 Steyer, supra note 68. 
70 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1829 (2015). 
71 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2018). 
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ingful control over their investments, the ERISA safe harbor 
protects plan fiduciaries from losses suffered by the 
participants.72 
Despite this safe harbor, plan participants have brought a 
number of litigation challenges in connection with employer-
sponsored 401(k) plans.73  These cases alleged that employers 
and plan administrators breached their fiduciary duties by pro-
viding menus of investment options that offered an insufficient 
number of choices of investment options, inferior investment 
options, or investment options that charged high fees.  Courts 
evaluating these challenges have given considerable weight to 
the role of participant choice, adopting the view that, as a gen-
eral matter, imperfections in some of the investment options 
can be mitigated so long as the plan contains some high-qual-
ity options and participants have sufficient choice. 
In the leading case, Hecker v. Deere & Co.,74 the Seventh 
Circuit held that a fiduciary satisfies its obligations under ER-
ISA by offering plan participants a suitable number of invest-
ment options with fees that were subject to market 
competition.  Deere’s plan provided employees with “a generous 
choice of investment options” that included “23 different Fidel-
ity mutual funds, two investment funds managed by Fidelity 
Trust, a fund devoted to Deere’s stock, and a Fidelity-operated 
facility called Brokerage Link, which gave participants access 
to some 2,500 additional funds managed by different compa-
nies.”75  Quoting the district court with approval, the Seventh 
Circuit noted that the fees among the primary funds ranged 
from “just over 1% to as low as .07%”76 and were offered to the 
general public, so the fees “were set against the backdrop of 
market competition.”77  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
the plan participants had the ability to protect themselves 
through their choice among these options, qualifying the plan 
for the protection of the statutory safe harbor.78 
72 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1). 
73 See generally Mercer Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideol-
ogy and the Empirical Consequences of the 401(k) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20 
CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 340–50 (2014) (describing several types of litigation chal-
lenges to employer-sponsored 401(k) plans). 
74 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009). 
75 Id. at 578. 
76 Id. at 581. 
77 Id. at 586; see also Hecker v. Deere & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (W.D. 
Wis. 2007) (concluding that it was “untenable to suggest that all of the more than 
2500 publicly available investment options had excessive expense ratios”). 
78 See Hecker, 556 F.3d at 589.  Notably, the Eighth Circuit reached a differ-
ent result but employed similar reasoning in Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 
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Similarly, in Renfro v. Unisys, the Third Circuit, in evaluat-
ing allegations of excessive fees, highlighted the fact that “[a]n 
ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer partici-
pants meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement 
savings.”79  The court found that the Unisys plan, which con-
tained “seventy-three distinct investment options [including] 
funds with a variety of risk and fee profiles, including low-risk 
and low-fee options” offered a reasonable range of investment 
options and that, as a result, plaintiffs had  not “plausibly al-
leged a breach of fiduciary duty.”80 
Perhaps the most important in these series of cases is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Tibble v. Edison International,81 in 
which the Court held that ERISA fiduciaries have a continuing 
duty to monitor the quality of the investments offered in their 
401(k) plans.  The Court specifically noted that this duty in-
cludes an obligation to remove imprudent investment options 
from the plan.  The Court did not consider, however, what con-
stituted an imprudent investment option or the extent to which 
a fiduciary could be liable if the plan offered sufficient 
alternatives. 
Recently a series of high-profile lawsuits targeted twelve 
major universities with similar allegations, challenging the 
structure of their 403(b) plans (the nonprofit equivalent of 
401(k) plans) including the choice of investment options, im-
prudent monitoring, and excessive fees.82  The lawsuits re-
sponded, in part, to the Tibble decision by alleging a breach of 
fiduciary duty due to the plan sponsors’ failure to remove un-
derperforming funds from the plan.  In addition, and, in con-
trast to some of the earlier challenges, most of these lawsuits 
also alleged that the plans were improperly structured because 
F.3d 585, 596 (8th Cir. 2009).  The Braden court refused to dismiss a lawsuit 
claiming that Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan included funds with unreasonably high fees, 
reasoning in part that the Wal-Mart plan offered a limited number of options, 
consisting of “ten mutual funds, a common/collective trust, Wal-Mart common 
stock, and a stable value fund.” Id. at 589.  Comparing the plan to the one at 
issue in Deere, the court observed that the “far narrower range of investment 
options available in this case makes more plausible the claim that this Plan was 
imprudently managed.” Id. at 596 n.6. 
79 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2011). 
80 Id. at 327–28. 
81 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015). 
82 See Clarissa A. Kang, New Wave of Retirement Fee Litigation: The University 
403(b) Lawsuits, TRUCKER HUSS (Jan. 2017), http://www.truckerhuss.com/2017/ 
02/new-wave-of-retirement-fee-litigation-the-university-403b-lawsuits/ [https:/ 
/perma.cc/E3QV-XPJN]; see also Nicolas v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 209100, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2017) (citing several such cases). 
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they offered plan participants too many investment options.83 
The complaints alleged that too many options “confus[ed]” par-
ticipants and prevented them from making educated choices.84 
Many of the cases are still pending, and courts have shown 
varied degrees of sympathy to the plaintiffs’ claims.85  For the 
most part, however, the courts have continued to focus on the 
primacy of participant choice and to dismiss claims that asked 
the court to second-guess the sponsor’s choice of investment 
options.  As the court explained in Henderson v. Emory Univer-
sity, for example, “[h]aving too many options does not hurt the 
Plans’ participants, but instead provides them opportunities to 
choose the investments that they prefer.”86 
Similarly, the court’s decision dismissing the lawsuit 
against the University of Pennsylvania highlighted the primacy 
of participant choice over an evaluation of each individual in-
vestment option.  The court reasoned that the liability standard 
under ERISA required the plaintiffs to show “systemic misman-
agement such that individuals are presented with a Hobson’s 
choice between a poorly-performing § 401(k) portfolio or no 
§401(k) at all.”87  The court described viable potential claims for 
a plan participant under ERISA as follows: 
A plaintiff can allege an inadequate “mix and range of op-
tions” by alleging insufficient choice, that all (or the vast ma-
jority of) options breach the fiduciary duty, an insufficient 
variety among the range of options, or a kickback scheme 
where the fiduciaries directly benefit at the expense of plan 
participants.88 
III 
THE DISTINCTIVE FINANCIAL ILLITERACY OF WORKPLACE-
ONLY INVESTORS 
A critical policy consideration in evaluating employer re-
sponsibility with respect to the structure of 401(k) plans is the 
83 See, e.g., Henderson v. Emory Univ., 252 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 
2017) (citing plaintiff’s allegation that “having too many investment options is 
imprudent”). 
84 See, e.g., Sacerdote v. N.Y.U., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137115, at *35 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017) (noting plaintiffs’ claim that the failure to limit the 
number of investment options is “confusing” for participants). 
85 See, e.g., Nicolas, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209100, at *7 (observing that in 
many of the cases, the courts have allowed claims to proceed beyond the motion 
to dismiss stage). 
86 Henderson, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 1350. 
87 Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
21, 2017). 
88 Id. at *14. 
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ability of plan participants to fend for themselves effectively. 
Whether employees are able to do so depends, in part, on the 
financial literacy of this distinctive category of investors—in-
vestors that are de facto forced to engage with the financial 
markets in order to participate in their employer-sponsored 
retirement plan.  To date, however, the literature has not fo-
cused on workplace-only investors. 
To document the financial knowledge and other character-
istics of these investors, we analyze data from the 2015 wave of 
the NFCS.89  This is one of the few surveys that provide detailed 
information not only on measures of personal finance and in-
dicators of money management behavior but also on the finan-
cial literacy of a large and representative sample of the U.S. 
population.  For the purpose of our analysis, we restrict the 
sample to those aged 25 to 60 and who are not retired, to focus 
on individuals who are not in school and must save and invest 
for retirement.90 
Our overall sample consists of 14,640 survey respondents. 
Of these, approximately 60% are, in the terminology of this 
Article, investors, meaning that they invest through an em-
ployer-provided retirement account, through a self-directed re-
tirement account, or through nonretirement account 
investments.  Through the questions included in the survey 
(detailed in the data appendix below), we divide the investors 
into two groups.  The first, whom we term workplace-only in-
vestors, are those who have retirement accounts through their 
employers in which they get to choose how the money is in-
vested but who do not have any other type of retirement ac-
count that they have set up themselves91 or any other financial 
investments in stocks, bonds, mutual funds or other securi-
ties.  Workplace-only investors are not a small group of the 
population of investors; in fact, they account for 28% of the 
population of investors considered in our analysis.  Thus, they 
are an important group to study. 
The second group of investors, whom we term active inves-
tors, are those who have made decisions about their invest-
89 The NFCS is a project of the FINRA Investor Education Foundation (FINRA 
Foundation). National Financial Capability Study, FINRA INV. EDUC. FOUND. 
(2015), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/results.php?region=us [https:// 
perma.cc/2QXM-NGMQ]. 
90 See the data appendix for a detailed description of the survey and the 
sample used in this empirical analysis. 
91 Other such retirement accounts might include an IRA, Keogh, or SEP IRA. 
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ments outside of an employer-provided retirement account.92 
Specifically, the active investors have private retirement ac-
counts they have set up themselves and/or financial invest-
ments in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or other securities.  We 
aggregate active investors into one group for purposes of com-
paring them to workplace-only investors, but we also consider 
them separately because they may display different motives to 
save and invest. Within the group of active investors, roughly 
50% have both a self-directed retirement account that they set 
up themselves and other financial investments. 
An advantage of using data from the NFCS is that it reports 
information on levels of financial literacy, and the information 
is richer than in many other data sets.93  Specifically, the NFCS 
has data on the Big Three financial literacy questions, which 
measure knowledge of basic financial literacy concepts— 
numeracy, inflation, and risk diversification.94  The NFCS also 
reports information on questions that measure knowledge of 
investing, such as the negative relationship between interest 
rates and bond prices.95  In 2015, a new financial literacy ques-
tion was added to the NFCS questionnaire measuring the 
knowledge of the workings of interest compounding in the con-
text of debt.96 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics about different invest-
ment groups by levels of financial literacy and demographics 
characteristics.97 
92 The data appendix provides more information about the composition of the 
investor groups used for this analysis.  Active investors can also have a defined 
contribution account with their employers, which is true for 68% of active inves-
tors in our sample. 
93 2015 National Financial Capability Study State-by-State Instrument (Ques-
tionnaire), FINRA INV. EDUC. FOUND. (2015) https://www.usfinancialcapability. 
org/downloads/NFCS_2015_State_by_State_Qre.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y58-
J2C4]. The raw survey data is freely downloadable from Data File Information: 
2015 State-by-State Survey, NAT’L FIN. CAPABILITY STUDY (June 19, 2016), https:// 
www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_State_by_State_Data_ 
Excel.zip [https://perma.cc/8NF9-EAZ2]. 
94 One of us pioneered the development and widespread use of the Big Three 
financial literacy questions which have been used to measure financial literacy 
around the world. See GLOB. FIN. LITERACY EXCELLENCE CTR., THREE QUESTIONS TO 
MEASURE  FINANCIAL  LITERACY, http://gflec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/3-
Questions-Article2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUF2-7GBJ] (describing the Big 
Three).  For an overview of findings related to the use of the Big Three, see Lusardi 
& Mitchell, supra note 6, at 497. 
95 FINRA INV’R EDUC. FOUND., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2016, 
at 28 (2016), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_Re 
port_Natl_Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTN5-2CG2]. 
96 Id. at 29. 
97 See the data appendix for a description of the variables used in the empiri-
cal work.  Note that the survey identifies participant characteristics at a specific 
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Table 1 shows that workplace-only investors are very dif-
ferent from other investors.  Their level of financial literacy is 
strikingly low and much lower than the financial literacy of 
active investors.  This difference in financial literacy is reflected 
both by the responses to the Big Three financial literacy ques-
tions, which measure basic financial knowledge, and the ques-
tions that deal with more sophisticated concepts, such as the 
concept of compound interest.  Specifically, only slightly more 
than one third (37%) of workplace-only investors have some 
basic financial knowledge as measured by the Big Three, and 
only 35% can answer the question about compound interest 
correctly. 
point in time.  Over the course of their lifetimes, investors may, for example, 
become active investors. 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Active Active in Active Workplace- Investor General 
Variables investor in retirement investors only population population
(weighted financial savings in investors 
mean) markets or financial 
ret. markets
savings
Financial 
literacy 
Big Three 0.4728 0.4853 0.4879 0.3658 0.4423 0.3280 
correct 
Risk 0.6183 0.6284 0.6359 0.4997 0.5845  0.4669 
diversification
Asset/Bond 0.3873 0.4040 0.4131 0.2612 0.3514 0.2748 
pricing
Interest comp.  0.4401 0.4462 0.4484 0.3510 0.4147 0.3416 
Mortgage 0.8550 0.8663 0.8582 0.8678 0.8586 0.7674 
Inflation 0.6780 0.6791 0.6710 0.6339 0.6654 0.5825
Gender
Male 0.5807 0.5685  0.6134 0.5017 0.5582 0.5072 
Female 0.4193 0.4315  0.3866 0.4983 0.4418 0.4928 
Ethnicity 
White 0.6559 0.6600 0.6514 0.6647 0.6584 0.6341 
Black 0.0952 0.0891 0.0910 0.1135  0.1004 0.1216 
Hispanic 0.1555  0.1523 0.1577 0.1516 0.1543 0.1661 
Asian 0.0755  0.0815  0.0822 0.0464 0.0672 0.0552 
Other 0.0179 0.0171 0.0178 0.0239 0.0196 0.0230 
Age 
25–34 years 0.2660 0.2435  0.2787 0.2821 0.2706 0.2915
35–49 years 0.3886 0.3924 0.3938 0.4401 0.4032 0.3973 
50–60 years 0.3454 0.3641 0.3275  0.2778 0.3262 0.3111 
Income 
Below 0.0670 0.0604 0.0580 0.0573 0.0642 0.2185
$25,000 
$25,000– 0.1670 0.1569 0.1473 0.2586 0.1931 0.2447 
$49,000 
$50,000– 0.4193 0.4159 0.4170 0.4657 0.4326 0.3415
$99,000 
Over 0.3467 0.3667 0.3778 0.2184 0.3102 0.1953 
$100,000 
Education 
High school or 0.1526 0.1467 0.1425  0.2143 0.1701 0.2628 
less
Some college 0.3739 0.3596 0.3643 0.4816 0.4046 0.4265
College 0.4735  0.4937 0.4933 0.3041 0.4252 0.3107 
graduate or
above
Marital status
Married 0.6643 0.6797 0.6733 0.6575  0.6624 0.5515
Single, not 0.2393 0.2263 0.2393 0.2209 0.2340 0.3109 
married 
Divorced or 0.0822 0.0809 0.0729 0.1133 0.0910 0.1213 
separated 
Widowed 0.0143 0.0130 0.0145  0.0084 0.0126 0.0163 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 22 10-AUG-20 12:10
       
  
 
762 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:741 
Employment
Employed 0.7615  0.7646 0.7692 0.8119 0.7759 0.6379 
(full, part 
time) 
Self-employed  0.1041 0.1040 0.1101 0.0350 0.0844 0.0863 
Unemployed 0.0325  0.0323 0.0276 0.0278 0.0312 0.0787 
Not in the 0.1019 0.0991 0.0931 0.1253 0.1086 0.1971 
labor force
Observations 6,322 4,892 4,574 2,459 8,781 14,640 
Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study. 
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are 
weighted. The averages for the financial literacy variables are lower in column 1 
versus column 2 or 3 because there is an overlap of about 50% between the two 
investor groups. As expected, the financial literacy of the overlapping group is 
higher compared to the level of those who belong to one investor group only. The 
Big Three financial literacy measure is a dummy variable with value 1 if the 
respondent answered the interest, inflation, and risk diversification questions 
correctly. The income brackets report household annual income from all sources, 
such as wages, tips, investment income, public assistance, and retirement plans. 
When we further compare across different investor groups, 
we find that the financial literacy of workplace-only investors 
differs from the knowledge of those who made active choices in 
their retirement savings.  Even though both types of investors 
may have similar motives to save and both utilize tax-favored 
investments, those who set up retirement accounts by them-
selves display much higher financial literacy than those we 
define as workplace-only investors.  The financial literacy of 
workplace-only investors is also lower than the financial liter-
acy of those who invested outside of retirement accounts. In 
other words, those who are likely to have made little or no 
choice about their retirement account know little about basic 
financial concepts.  These are of course simple correlations, 
but they highlight the differences in financial knowledge across 
investors and, in particular, the low levels of financial literacy 
of workplace-only investors. 
The financial literacy of workplace-only investors is partic-
ularly low and alarming when looking at concepts specifically 
connected with investment decisions, such as bond pricing 
(measuring whether respondents know the inverse relationship 
between asset pricing and interest rates) and risk diversifica-
tion (measuring whether respondents know whether a com-
pany stock is riskier or safer than a stock mutual fund and 
what stocks and stock mutual funds are).  Only half of work-
place-only investors have some rudimentary knowledge of risk 
diversification and only 26% know about basic asset pricing. 
In this respect, the financial knowledge of workplace-only in-
vestors more closely resembles that of the general population 
than the population of investors. 
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Table 1 also contains demographic information on our 
sample population.  Looking at the demographic characteris-
tics of the different investor groups, we see that workplace-only 
investors are more likely to include vulnerable subgroups of 
the population.  For example, workplace-only investors are 
much more likely than other investors to be people with lower 
income and less education, those with split families (divorced/ 
separated), and women.  As expected, workplace-only investors 
are less likely to be self-employed, but self-employment is not 
the main driver for having a non-employer-based retirement 
account. 
A high proportion of those who have employer-sponsored 
401(k) accounts are young workers.  One may argue that retire-
ment accounts will introduce workers to investment and fi-
nance and that their financial literacy will improve over time. At 
least within our sample, this does not seem to be the case. 
When we split the sample into two age groups, those younger 
and those older than age 40, we find that the knowledge gap 
between workplace-only investors and other investors does not 
decrease across age groups.  Table 2 reports demographic in-
formation for the split sample.  Table 2a shows the information 
for investors under 40, and Table 2b reports the results for 
investors over 40.  Looking at those older than 40, we continue 
to see a large difference in financial knowledge between work-
place-only investors and active investors. Yet again, workplace-
only investors more closely resemble the general older popula-
tion than the population of older investors.  In other words, our 
older workplace-only investors do not seem to have acquired a 
lot of financial knowledge.98 
98 It is worth noting that in a single cross-section, we cannot separate age 
from cohort effects.  Moreover, our analysis is at a single point in time—2015— 
and respondents in our survey may have switched groups prior to the time at 
which they respond.  Because the NFCS is not a panel data set, we cannot follow 
the same individual over time. 
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TABLE 2A: Financial Literacy Measures for Individuals 
Younger than 40 Years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
(weighted 
mean)
Active 
investor in
financial 
markets or
Active in
retirement
savings
Active 
investors 
in 
financial 
Workplace-
only
investors 
Investor 
population 
General  
population
ret. savings market
Financial 
literacy 
Big Three 0.3737 0.3710 0.3797 0.2998 0.3520 0.2586 
correct
Risk 0.5447 0.5384 0.5496 0.4404 0.5141 0.4148 
diversification
Asset/Bond 0.3297 0.3353 0.3416 0.2340 0.3017 0.2313 
pricing
Interest 0.4536 0.4639 0.4563 0.3804 0.4321 0.3582 
comp.
Mortgage 0.8133 0.8234 0.8202 0.8442 0.8224 0.7352 
Inflation 0.5354 0.5208 0.5222 0.5307 0.5340 0.4653 
Observations 2,718 1,988 2,014 1,152 3,870 6,704 
Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study. 
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–40; all estimates are 
weighted. Some of the averages for the financial literacy variables are lower in 
column 1 versus column 2 or 3 because there is an overlap between the two 
investor groups. As expected, the financial literacy of the overlapping group is 
higher compared to the level of those who belong to one investor group only. The 
Big Three financial literacy measure is a dummy variable with value 1 if the 
respondent answered the interest, inflation, and risk diversification questions 
correctly. 
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TABLE 2B: Financial Literacy Measures for Individuals Older 
than 40 Years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
(weighted 
mean)
Active 
investor in
financial 
markets or
Active in
retirement
savings
Active 
investors 
in 
financial 
Workplace-
only
investors 
Investor 
population 
General  
population
ret. savings market
Financial 
literacy 
Big Three 0.5497 0.5651 0.5779 0.4209 0.5139 0.3865
correct
Risk 0.6754 0.6912 0.7077 0.5492 0.6403 0.5109 
diversification
Asset/Bond 0.4320 0.4520 0.4726 0.2839 0.3909 0.3114 
pricing
Interest 0.4295  0.4339 0.4418 0.3264 0.4009 0.3276 
comp.
Mortgage 0.8874 0.8963 0.8898 0.8876 0.8874 0.7945
Inflation 0.7886 0.7897 0.7946 0.7203 0.7696 0.6813 
Observations 3,604 2,904 2,560 1,307 4,911 7,936 
Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study. 
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 41–60; all estimates are 
weighted. The averages for the financial literacy variables are lower in column 1 
versus column 2 or 3 because there is an overlap between the two investor 
groups. As expected, the financial literacy of the overlapping group is higher 
compared to the level of those who belong to one investor group only. The Big 
Three financial literacy measure is a dummy variable with value 1 if the respon-
dent answered the interest, inflation, and risk diversification questions correctly. 
Table 3 reports the results of regression analyses in which 
we analyze different investor types taking into consideration 
their different demographic characteristics and levels of finan-
cial literacy.99  Several findings stand out.  First, financial liter-
acy continues to be associated with a higher likelihood of being 
an active investor, even after controlling for many demographic 
characteristics, including age and education. Financial sophis-
tication in particular—for example knowing about asset pric-
ing—is associated with being an active investor and not a 
workplace-only investor (note that the estimates of this finan-
cial literacy measure change sign across investor types; i.e., 
those who know about basic asset pricing are less likely to be a 
workplace-only investor and more likely to have both retire-
ment accounts they set up themselves and other financial 
investments). 
99 We are aware that the classification of investors is not exogenous but the 
result of choice and, moreover, that some variables, such as financial literacy, can 
be considered endogenous.  However, this is simply a descriptive analysis and 
does not purport to address causation. 
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TABLE 3: Regression Results Across Investor Groups 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Active investor in Active in Active investors Workplace-
(weighted mean) financial markets retirement in financial only investors
or ret. savings savings market
Risk diversification 0.091***  0.068***  0.071***  0.012*
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Asset/Bond pricing 0.088***  0.084***  0.093*** -0.029***
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Interest comp.  0.067***  0.055***  0.046*** -0.003 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Gender
Female -0.045*** -0.016** -0.063***  0.009 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Ethnicity (BL: White) 
Black 0.001 -0.011 0.002 0.009 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Hispanic -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.022***
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Asian 0.063***  0.077***  0.075*** -0.038***
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Other -0.036 -0.036 -0.018 0.015
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
Age (BL: 25-34)
35–49 years -0.023**  0.006 -0.032***  0.008 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
50–60 years 0.057***  0.084***  0.006 -0.020**
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Income (BL: <$25,000)
$25,000–$49,000  0.107***  0.075***  0.062***  0.120***
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
$50,000–$99,000  0.271***  0.203***  0.201***  0.170***
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Over $100,000  0.414***  0.336***  0.350***  0.137***
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Education (BL: High school or less) 
Some college 0.049***  0.032***  0.032***  0.031***
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
College graduate or 0.181***  0.157***  0.135*** -0.019**
above (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Marital status
Married 0.028***  0.031***  0.019**  0.021***
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Employment
Unemployed -0.067*** -0.040*** -0.060*** -0.048***
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant 0.043*** -0.015  0.051***  0.039***
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 14,640 14,640 14,640 14,640
R-squared 0.246 0.195  0.199 0.042 
Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study. 
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are 
weighted. Married is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is 
married, but not divorced, separated or widowed, and 0 otherwise. Income brack-
ets report household annual income from all sources, such as wages, tips, invest-
ment income, public assistance, and retirement plans. The abbreviation BL 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 27 10-AUG-20 12:10
767 2020] DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN 
stands for baseline, which is the reference group. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In addition, several demographic variables play an impor-
tant role.  We find, unsurprisingly, an education divide when it 
comes to investing.  Those with college or higher degrees are 
much more likely to be active investors, both in retirement 
savings and other financial investments, and are less likely to 
be workplace-only investors.  Importantly, however, both gen-
eral education and specialized financial knowledge matter for 
investment behavior; there is an independent effect of financial 
literacy even after controlling for education.  Second, women 
are much less likely to be active investors both in retirement 
and other financial investments.100  Third, individuals with 
higher income are more likely to be investors, both workplace-
only and active ones, but the effect estimate is particularly 
large for being active investors for those with income greater 
than $100,000. 
Finally, the effect of age appears to vary.  Older investors 
who are below 50 are less likely to be active investors, while in 
the 50 to 60 age range, they are less likely to be workplace-only 
investors and instead are more likely to have other retirement 
accounts.  We suspect that this age effect is the product of the 
evolution of employer-based retirement savings plans de-
scribed above—some participants over 50 may already have 
changed jobs (even several times) and, upon leaving their em-
ployer, rolled their former 401(k) savings over into an IRA. In 
addition, the oldest participants in our survey may have de-
fined benefit rather than defined contribution plans and have 
other financial investments. 
To better understand these findings and their implications, 
we turn to additional information, which is summarized in Fig-
ure 1.  The NFCS asks survey participants if they were offered 
100 This finding is consistent with other research reporting a persistent gender 
gap in financial literacy. See, e.g., Gary Mottola, Gender, Generation and Finan-
cial Knowledge: A Six-Year Perspective, FINRA INV. EDUC. FOUND. INSIGHTS: FIN. 
CAPABILITY (March 2018), https://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/Is-
sue-Brief-Gender-Generation-and-Financial-Knowledge-A-Six-Year-Perspec-
tive.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XHX-XMU7] (finding that NFCS data reveal a 
persistent financial literacy gender gap between 2009 and 2015).  Commentators 
have suggested women may be less exposed to financial education through the 
workplace. See Dawn Doebler, 12 Reasons Women Need to Close the Financial 
Literacy Gap, WTOP (Sept. 5, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://wtop.com/business-fi-
nance/2018/09/12-reasons-women-need-to-close-the-financial-literacy-gap/ 
[https://perma.cc/CX6F-J7LL].  Importantly, however, our findings suggest that 
women’s exposure to 401(k) plans does not address the gender gap. 
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financial education either in school or college or in their work-
place.  Not surprisingly, we find that workplace-only investors 
were much less likely to be exposed to financial education (Fig-
ure 1).  Only about 30% of workplace-only investors were of-
fered financial education versus about 45% of all other 
investors.  This may explain their lower levels of financial liter-
acy and also why these low levels of financial knowledge persist 
until an older age. 
FIGURE 1: Financial Education Offered in School or the 
Workplace Across Investor Groups 
50% 46%45%43% 
31% 
40% 
32% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
40% 
45% 
(1) Active (2) Active in (3) Active (4) Workplace- (5) Investor (6) General 
investor in retirement investors only investors population population 
financial savings in financial 
market or market 
retirement 
Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study. 
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are 
weighted. The numbers in the figure represent the percentages of investors who 
were offered financial education. The percentages are shown in relation to the 
particular investor sample (for example, 31% of workplace-only investors were 
offered financial education). In order to keep the investor samples consistent 
across the various analyses in this paper, the “do not know” and “prefer not to 
say” responses to the financial education question are not excluded from the 
investor samples. The exact question asked to measure who were offered financial 
education is “Was financial education offered by a school or college you attended, 
or a workplace where you were employed?” 
We examine next some proxies for personal finances and 
personal financial management to assess whether workplace-
only investors are also less attentive when it comes to other 
financial decisions.  This is important because other decisions 
about personal finances, not just retirement savings, can influ-
ence whether individuals can achieve a secure retirement. The 
results are reported in Table 4.  In Table 4a, we report the list of 
assets and liabilities that workplace-only and active investors 
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hold, and, in Table 4b, we report some proxies for financial 
management. 
TABLE 4A: Assets and Liabilities Across Investor Groups 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Active Active in Active Workplace- Investor Total 
investor in retirement investors only population population
financial savings in investors 
markets or financial 
ret. market
savings  
Assets
Has a 99.22% 99.15% 99.55% 98.39% 98.98% 93.49%
checking or
savings
account
Has a 93.08% 100% 90.60% 100% 95.05% 61.82%
retirement 
account
Owns a home 78.01% 80.24% 79.90% 64.96% 74.29% 59.42%
Liabilities
Has credit 46.09% 44.27% 44.08% 64.80% 51.11% 53.70%
card debt*
Has an auto 42.88% 43.67% 43.57% 50.29% 44.99% 35.65% 
loan 
Has a student 31.78% 31.13% 32.56% 37.28% 33.35% 31.46%
loan 
Has a home 70.64% 71.96% 69.66% 77.23% 72.28% 68.13%
mortgage*
Observations 6,322 4,892 4,574 2,459 8,781 14,640 
Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study. 
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are 
weighted. The variable “has a retirement account” refers to both employer-spon-
sored plans and private retirement accounts. Variables with an asterisk indicate 
that the statistics are conditional on having the related asset. The total number of 
observations relate to the statistics of the variables without asterisk. In order to 
keep the investor samples consistent across the various analyses in this paper, 
the “do not know” and “prefer not to say” responses to the asset and liability 
questions are not excluded from the investor samples. 
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TABLE 4B: Management of Personal Finances Across 
Investor Groups 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Active Active in Active Workplace- Investor Total 
investor in retirement investors only population population
financial savings in investors 
markets or financial 
ret. market
savings  
Checking account mgmt.
Occasionally 19.94% 19.65%  21.79% 24.87% 21.34% 22.30%
overdraws
checking
accounts*
Credit card mgmt.
Has made only 27.87% 26.29% 27.18% 46.28% 32.80% 38.10%
the minimum 
payment*
Charged a fee 14.16% 14.57% 14.54% 17.07% 14.94% 16.43%
for late 
payment*
Charged an 9.88% 11.20% 10.98% 7.51% 9.24% 9.39%
over-the-limit 
fee*
Charged fee for 12.85% 12.80% 13.70% 12.03% 12.63% 12.55% 
cash advances*
Demonstrated 35.96% 34.07% 35.47% 51.16% 40.03% 44.73%
at least one 
expensive 
behavior*
Retirement savings mgmt.
Took a loan*  15.11% 16.06% 17.34% 11.24% 13.92% 13.92%
Made a 12.43% 13.63% 14.71% 6.19% 10.52% 10.52%
hardship
withdrawal*
Made some 18.08% 18.97% 20.04% 14.38% 16.94% 16.94%
form of
withdrawal*
Use of alternative financial services
Used at least 24.22% 23.49% 26.02% 26.20% 24.78% 29.31%
one form of
alternative 
financial 
services
Observations 6,322 4,892 4,574 2,459 8,781 14,640
Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study. 
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are 
weighted. All variables related to managing personal finances refer to the past year 
except for the use of alternative financial services which refers to the past 5 years. 
Alternative financial services include auto title loans, payday loans, pawn shops, and 
rent-to-own stores. The variables related to retirement savings refer to both employer-
sponsored plans and private retirement accounts. Variables with an asterisk indicate 
that the statistics are conditional on having the related asset. The total number of 
observations relate to the statistics of the variables without asterisk. In order to keep 
the investor samples consistent across the various analyses in this paper, the “do not 
know” and “prefer not to say” responses to the questions used to construct the vari-
ables in the table are not excluded from the investor samples. 
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There are some noteworthy findings here as well to under-
stand the differences between workplace-only investors and 
other investors.  Workplace-only investors are less likely to own 
assets, such as a house, than active investors.  They are also 
substantially more likely than active investors to be in debt and 
carry different types of debt, from student loans to mortgages (if 
they own a home), to auto loans.  When it comes to debt, the 
financial situation of workplace-only investors appears, in the 
ways measured here, to be worse than even the general 
population. 
Workplace-only investors are also particularly likely to 
carry credit card debt, which is a concern because of the higher 
rate of interest typically associated with credit card debt.  To 
better consider the management of credit cards, in Table 4b we 
look at what one of us has dubbed expensive credit card behav-
ior, i.e., paying the minimum only, going over the limit, using 
the card for a cash advance, and paying fees for late pay-
ments.101  What we find is that workplace-only investors ex-
hibit a behavior that is conducive to paying high interest rates 
and fees on credit cards. 
A variety of additional evidence suggests that workplace-
only investors are less likely to be financially savvy, more likely 
to face liquidity constraints, or both.  About a quarter of work-
place-only investors overdraw from their checking accounts.  A 
quarter of them also use alternative financial services, such as 
payday loans, auto title loans, pawn shops or rent-to-own 
shops, which charge very high interest rates, often well above 
100%.  Interestingly, workplace-only investors are less likely to 
borrow against their retirement accounts, for example taking 
out a loan or making a hardship withdrawal, even though bor-
rowing from a retirement account is likely to involve lower costs 
than using alternative financial services or borrowing using 
credit cards. 
In sum, our results demonstrate that workplace-only in-
vestors differ from other, more active investors not just in fi-
nancial decisions with respect to their retirement accounts but 
also in financial decisions related to the management of their 
assets and liabilities.  Debt, in particular, is a concern as work-
place-only investors carry different types of debt, some of which 
charges high rates of interest.  This evidence speaks of the 
importance for financial education, in particular for workplace-
only investors, a topic that we address in Part V below. 
101 See Annamaria Lusardi & Peter Tufano, Debt Literacy, Financial Exper-
iences, and Overindebtedness, 14 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 332, 349 (2015). 
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IV 
IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL ILLITERACY FOR 401(K) 
INVESTING 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, U.S. retirement 
savings has evolved into a system that imposes substantial 
responsibility on individual employees to determine how much 
to save and how to invest that money.  Our results pose several 
critical challenges for such a system.  First, as noted above, 
financial illiteracy impedes plan participants’ ability to deter-
mine what is the best use of 401(k) plan, for example, how to 
invest their savings.  ERISA explicitly relies on employee choice 
as the basis for limiting the employers’ fiduciary responsibili-
ties with respect to defined contribution plans,102 but limited 
financial literacy suggests a level of incapacity that renders 
true employee choice illusory. 
Historically, the ERISA standard has relied heavily on the 
importance of participant choice.  Employer responsibility 
under ERISA’s fiduciary standard is limited, so long as the 
employer offers participants reasonable investment options.103 
The financial illiteracy of plan participants raises questions 
about their ability to exercise reasonable choice, however.  If 
plan participants lack the ability to distinguish between invest-
ment options and reject inferior or inappropriate choices, it is 
arguably problematic for a plan to include those choices, and it 
may not be reasonable for courts or regulators to accept a plan 
merely on the basis that it contains some high-quality op-
tions.104  In addition, the literature has demonstrated that, 
probably because of low financial literacy, the menu of invest-
ment options offered by a plan can affect participant deci-
sions—menus matter.105 
On the other hand, excessive judicial scrutiny of plan com-
position raises a competing set of issues.  If the employer has 
an obligation to choose what is, in its view, the most appropri-
ate investments for its employees, that role substantially er-
odes participant choice, which is the bedrock of the defined 
102 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2018). 
103 See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 325–27 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(highlighting the relevance of the reasonableness of available investment options 
when evaluating a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA). 
104 See Ayres & Curtis, supra note 55, at 1504–05 (describing inferior funds as 
“dominated funds” and arguing that it is a potential breach of an employer’s 
fiduciary duty to include dominated funds in a 401(k) plan). 
105 Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4–5, 8 (2006). 
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contribution model.106  Moreover, there are a variety of reasons 
to prefer a choice-preserving approach, including the inability 
of courts, regulators, and employers to determine accurately 
the best interests of plan participants.107 
These concerns are magnified in the context of plans that, 
as a practical matter, rely primarily on paternalistic employer 
choices rather than actual participant choice. With auto-en-
rollment and auto-escalation and default investment options, 
employers are the ones deciding whether their employees will 
save for retirement, how much they will save, and how that 
money should be invested.  In these plans, the employee effec-
tively has decisions about whether and how to invest made for 
him or her.  Although employees can, in theory, reject their 
employers’ decisions, financially illiterate plan participants are 
poorly positioned to do so.  These innovations in the structure 
of 401(k) plans thus raise the question of the extent of an 
employer’s obligation to validate the choices made for its em-
ployees.  ERISA’s fiction that employees can protect themselves 
from bad or inappropriate choices by opting out seems particu-
larly inapposite.  Indeed, opt ins are designed to alleviate inac-
tion by employees; this inaction is likely to limit opt out as well, 
which refutes the proposition that a failure to opt out reflects 
an informed choice by the employee. 
Moreover, while paternalistic responses such as auto-en-
rollment may provide a partial solution to financial illiteracy by 
causing a higher percentage of employees to save for retirement 
and by defaulting them into a reasonable investment option, 
they focus employers primarily on their employees’ initial en-
rollment and investment decisions.  The limited ability of plan 
participants to navigate the challenges of retirement investing 
has implications that extend beyond those initial decisions, 
however. 
One concern is that, over the course of a plan participant’s 
career, they may need to adjust the amount that they save for 
retirement or the manner in which they invest that savings. 
The stickiness of defaults such as savings amounts and target 
date fund investments may suggest to employees that the 
structure of the plan is consistent with their individual inter-
106 But see Bubb & Pildes, supra note 60, at 1601 (arguing that, where partici-
pants are unlikely to act in a welfare-maximizing manner, deference to their 
choice is inappropriate). 
107 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 
211 (2013–2014) (identifying a variety of reasons for preferring a choice-based 
approach to a mandate). 
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ests.  But the use of defaults is premised on the assumption 
that employees can determine whether the defaults are appro-
priate, and in many cases, the low levels of financial literacy 
suggest they cannot.  Auto-escalation provisions respond to the 
stickiness of the initial default but may increase the employee’s 
willingness to defer to the automatic components of the plan 
and may lead to an increase in debt, reducing the increase in 
net savings. 
The problem that one size does not fit all with respect to 
retirement savings heightens this concern.  Although it may be 
relatively straightforward to design a reasonable default strat-
egy for entry-level employees, many of which are young, have 
limited savings, may carry student loans, and can be expected 
to work for thirty or forty years, the situations of plan partici-
pants become more varied as they age.  Their health, financial 
status and debt obligations, sources of income, dependents, 
and other factors affect the appropriate savings rate and level 
of risk in their retirement accounts.  Paternalism that defaults 
employees into a generic retirement plan without providing 
them with the tools to determine if adjustments to that default 
are appropriate may do little to help workers and may even 
hurt them.108  As discussed in more detail later, employees 
frequently change employers, and employers face today a het-
erogeneous population of employees. 
A second and perhaps greater concern is that, to the extent 
that participants are successful in accumulating a large bal-
ance for retirement in their 401(k) plans, they then become 
responsible for deciding what to do with that money when retir-
ing or changing jobs.  Nothing in the existing regulatory struc-
ture creates a role for the employer in assisting its employees 
with decisions about how to use that account balance to fund 
their retirement, including deciding whether to roll over the 
account, determining how much to withdraw and figuring out 
how to invest what is, for most retirees, more money than they 
have ever been responsible before.109  As early plan partici-
pants begin to retire, their experiences are highlighting new 
vulnerabilities including the risk that they will be persuaded to 
roll their 401(k) assets over into an account that charges them 
108 The high proportion of Americans carrying high-cost debt is one reason for 
concern about policies that focus on only one component of people’s financial 
wellbeing. 
109 Zelinksy, supra note 37, at 456–57 (“Typically the distribution from a de-
fined contribution plan today takes the form of a single lump sum payout of the 
employee’s account balance rather than an annuity or other periodic distribution 
spread over time.”). 
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substantially higher fees,110 the risk that they will be per-
suaded to invest in unsuitable products that they do not un-
derstand, and the risk that they will be the victims of outright 
fraud.111 
IRA rollovers offer an example of the challenges faced by 
401(k) plan participants, challenges that are exacerbated by 
financial illiteracy.  Upon retirement, a 401(k) participant typi-
cally has the choice of whether to keep their money in their 
employer’s plan or to roll it over into an individual retirement 
account or IRA.  An IRA allows the retiree access to the services 
of professional financial adviser as well as, in most case, a 
greater variety of investment options than are available in a 
typical 401(k) plan.112  In most cases, however, IRAs also in-
volve higher fees.113 
In any given case, the decision to roll over a 401(k) account 
depends in part on whether the higher fees associated with the 
IRA are cost-justified in terms of the retiree’s access to better 
advice or products.  But IRAs are particularly problematic in 
that the primary source of information on this trade-off is the 
outside adviser, whose compensation depends on whether he 
or she is successful in persuading the retiree to roll the money 
over.114  The adviser is therefore subject to a serious conflict of 
interest, which is magnified by the economic importance of 
rollovers to the financial services industry; the vast majority of 
the money in IRA accounts is not additional money that cus-
tomers have saved independently but rather money that has 
been rolled over from a 401(k) account.115 
110 See Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. Sec. &  Exch. Comm., Speech at the Am. Retire-
ment Initiative’s Winter 2014 Summit: Protecting the Financial Future of Seniors 
and Retirees (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-
spch020414laa [https://perma.cc/AYL8-PG89] (warning that “the SEC will ex-
amine the sales practices of investment advisers that are targeting retirement-age 
workers to rollover their employer-sponsored 401(k) plans into higher cost 
investments”). 
111 See Marguerite DeLiema, Martha Deevy, Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. 
Mitchell, Financial Fraud Among Older Americans: Evidence and Implications, 75 
J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 861 (2020). 
112 See John A. Turner, The Pension Mis-Selling Scandal, the SEC, and the 
Fiduciary Standard, 23 CONN. INS. L.J. 263, 269–71 (2016). 
113 See, e.g., Anne Tergesen & Anna Prior, The New Regulatory Hurdle for IRAs, 
WALL  ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/iras-have-a-regula-
tory-headache-coming-1459108346 [https://perma.cc/QT6N-AA3B] (noting that 
IRAs often hold higher fee investments than 401(k) plans); Turner, supra note 
112, at 263 (comparing fees associated with 401(k) plans with those commonly 
paid for IRAs). 
114 See Turner, supra note 112, at 265–66. 
115 Tergesen & Prior, supra note 113 (observing that “rollovers now account for 
more than 90% of the money flowing into IRAs each year”). 
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In the face of this conflict, financially illiterate employees 
are particularly at risk.  Some financial advisers have taken 
advantage of this vulnerability—offering retirees bonuses and 
free products as incentives to roll over their 401(k) plans,116 the 
value of which are dwarfed by the high fees that the adviser 
subsequently collects on the account.117 
Existing evidence suggests that a substantial number of 
people are moving money from their employer-sponsored plans 
into higher cost alternatives,118 but whether those alternatives 
are beneficial remains unclear.  This is an important consider-
ation because it is not always the case that financially illiterate 
employees follow the path of least resistance—in this case stay-
ing in the employer sponsored plans—when becoming the tar-
get of unscrupulous financial advisers. The concern is 
sufficient that the DOL’s now-defunct fiduciary rule119 dealt 
specifically with rollovers, both requiring an investment adviser 
to obtain information prior to recommending a rollover and 
applying a fiduciary standard to the adviser’s recommendation. 
Retirees will also face the decision of whether to withdraw 
the money from retirement accounts as a lump sum, to make 
withdrawals on a periodic or as-needed basis, or to invest in 
116 See, e.g., Kevin Mercadante, These 5 Brokers Will Pay You to Rollover Your 
IRA, MONEYUNDER30 (May 25, 2017), https://www.moneyunder30.com/ira-rol-
lover-promotions [https://perma.cc/FR5G-64LA] (last modified Oct. 17, 2019) 
(describing cash incentives offered by six brokers to persuade investors to roll over 
the assets in their 401(k) accounts). 
117 See Anne Tergesen, Be Wary of Financial Firms’ 401(k) Rollover Advice, 
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/be-wary-of-
financial-firms-401k-rollover-advice-2014-12-04 [https://perma.cc/D2QW-
SHE2] (observing that “many participants in 401(k) plans—particularly those in 
plans sponsored by large companies, which frequently offer bargain-priced insti-
tutional funds—could be shortchanged by switching to an IRA”). 
118 IRA assets are projected to increase to $12.6 trillion by 2022, and the 
overwhelming majority of IRA contributions currently are the result of rollovers 
from 401(k) plans. See Greg Iacurci, IRA Assets Will Almost Double Those in 
401(k) Plans Over Next Five Years, INV. NEWS (June 25, 2018), https:// 
www.investmentnews.com/article/20180625/FREE/180629951/ira-assets-will-
almost-double-those-in-401-k-plans-over-next-five [https://perma.cc/7KSV-
7Z6B]. 
119 In 2016, the Department of Labor adopted the Fiduciary Rule.  Definition of 
the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice 
(Final Fiduciary Definition), 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016). Subsequently, a 
federal court invalidated the rule in Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 
885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018).  Following the ruling, the US Department of Labor 
announced that it did not intend to enforce the rule. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD 
ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 2018-02 (May 7, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ 
ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-02 
[https://perma.cc/3H32-WRXA]. 
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annuities, which are complex financial products.120  These are 
areas where the adoption of defaults or automatic enrollment 
cannot easily be implemented as a substitute for participant 
choice.  In particular, the determination of which of these op-
tions is preferable depends on a personalized analysis of an 
individual’s financial condition.  In addition, a number of these 
decisions such as the decision to roll money over into an IRA or 
to purchase an annuity are costly or impossible to reverse.121 
Finally, for those simply changing jobs, they have to decide 
what to do with their accumulated retirement savings.  This 
may involve managing multiple retirement accounts from dif-
ferent employers.  An employee may also need to analyze, in 
light of their retirement plan from their prior employer, how to 
make the current employer’s policy for enrollment, contribu-
tions, and investment in retirement accounts fit their specific 
needs. 
V 
IMPROVING RETIREMENT INVESTING THROUGH 401(K) 
PLANS 
As the foregoing parts have detailed, the financial literacy 
of workplace-only investors threatens the effectiveness of a 
participant-directed approach to retirement savings. This part 
identifies two possible responses.  In subpart V.A we consider 
increasing employer responsibility for the appropriateness of 
their 401(k) programs.  Alternatively, in subpart V.B we evalu-
ate the potential for employers to address the deficiencies in 
their employees’ financial literacy through financial education 
programs. 
120 See, e.g., Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regu-
lation of Investment Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & EN-
TREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47, 71 (2014) (observing that “annuities have grown more 
complex” and describing various types of annuities). 
121 Most annuities are subject to a substantial surrender charge if the 
purchase seeks to cash in the policy early, that is, prior to the end of a designated 
“surrender period.”  In addition, because of their complexity and the distribution 
channels through which they are sold, fraudulent practices are common. See 
Joseph H. Aughtman, The Annuity Conundrum: Responding to the Abuse of Eld-
erly Investors, 38 BRIEF 38, 39 (2008) (“[W]ith a frequency that is disturbing, 
annuities are being used as instruments to defraud investors.”); Fischler v. Am-
south Bancorporation, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17670, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 
1996) (rejecting motion to dismiss securities fraud claim based on failure to dis-
close the surrender charge in connection with the sale of an annuity). 
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A. Employer Responsibility as a Substitute for Employee 
Financial Literacy 
One possible solution to the financial illiteracy of involun-
tary investors is to place greater responsibility on employers to 
ensure that their employees are investing appropriately for re-
tirement.  The limited fiduciary responsibilities imposed by ER-
ISA, which rely on participant control, may be inappropriate in 
an environment in which participants are unable to exercise 
effective control and rely, directly or indirectly, on their employ-
ers to protect their interests.  In this context, traditional fiduci-
ary duties rather than judicial deference to employee judgment 
may be appropriate. 
Greater employer responsibility could take several forms. 
Congress could narrow or eliminate the ERISA safe harbor for 
participant-directed plans.  The courts could modify their in-
terpretation of the existing safe harbor and reject the argument 
that participant choice is an adequate remedy for poor plan 
menus or the inclusion of high cost funds.  As an alternative to 
a hard-to-apply fiduciary standard, ERISA could impose more 
detailed requirements concerning the structure of 401(k) 
plans.  For example, the Department of Labor could validate 
particular investment options as suitable for inclusion in a 
401(k) plan based on factors such as cost, asset mix, and 
risk.122 
ERISA could also require employers to oversee or ensure 
the appropriateness of the choices made by their employees.  It 
could impose an obligation on employers to ensure that em-
ployees met minimum savings thresholds, through mecha-
nisms such as mandating higher participation rates, requiring 
employer matching, or requiring employers to meet shortfalls 
in instances in which employees are unable to save enough 
through their own contributions.  These obligations would ex-
tend employer responsibility beyond the standards that are 
currently required by ERISA and that have been the subject of 
recent litigation. 
There are two primary obstacles to using greater employer 
responsibility to address the current problems with retirement 
122 The Department of Labor currently does something analogous to this by 
approving qualified default investment alternatives for 401(k) plans that provide 
automatic enrollment. See EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT 
SHEET: DEFAULT  INVESTMENT  ALTERNATIVES  UNDER  PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED  INDIVIDUAL 
ACCOUNT  PLANS (Sept. 2006), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/ 
our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/default-investment-alternatives-
under-participant-directed-individual-account-plans [https://perma.cc/4MQY-
N96H]. 
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investing.  The first is the challenge of identifying a workable 
standard of conduct.123  As existing litigation in this area dem-
onstrates, it is difficult to design a perfect retirement plan— 
questions such as the choice of investment options and fee 
structure involve predictions about the future state of the 
world, predictions about employee behavior, and policy choices 
about the most appropriate structure to accommodate employ-
ees with different needs and preferences.  A standard that criti-
cally evaluated the quality of an employer’s plan design would 
be judicially unmanageable.  As the court noted in Sweda, 
there are a variety of rational choices that an employer or plan 
administrator can make in designing a plan.124  Related is the 
problem that the employer’s decisions will be challenged after 
the fact, leading to the risk of hindsight bias.  The fact that 
some choices work out better than others with the benefit of 
hindsight125 or benefit some employees more than others does 
not make a decision unreasonable.126 
The second problem with imposing greater employer re-
sponsibility is that the most likely consequence of such liability 
would be a substantial decrease in employers’ willingness to 
provide retirement plans to their employees.  It is important to 
keep in mind that employers have discretion as to whether to 
provide 401(k) plans as an employee benefit.  Both the direct 
costs of meeting additional regulatory requirements and the 
indirect costs of liability exposure under such a regime would 
be substantial and would increase the costs to an employer of 
providing a plan.  The natural result would be fewer employer-
sponsored plans.  Because many employees are unlikely to 
save adequately for retirement outside an employer-sponsored 
plan, a decline in the availability of employer plans could re-
duce overall retirement savings, and the cost of insufficient 
savings would eventually be borne by taxpayers generally. 
123 Cf. Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regula-
tory Damage, 92 TUL. L. REV. 339, 356–61 (2017) (identifying problems with apply-
ing the standard of conduct contemplated by the Department of Labor’s Fiduciary 
Rule to advisers’ relationships with their retirement customers). 
124 See Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., No. 16-4329, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153958, at 
*4–7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2017). 
125 In addition, as the Sweda court observed, the fact that a plan’s invest-
ments underperform the market is not an indication of inappropriate decision-
making.  Standard statistics would predict that half of all investments would 
underperform the median. Id. at *29–30. 
126 See, e.g., Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 338 (8th Cir. 2014) (“While it 
is easy to pick an investment option in retrospect (buy Apple Inc. at $7 a share in 
December 2000 and short Enron Corp. at $90 a share), selecting an investment 
beforehand is difficult.”). 
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Similarly, it would be problematic to impose liability on 
employers that implement auto-enrollment or auto-escalation 
features.  The evidence indicates that these features lead to 
higher rates of employee participation, and employees are 
clearly better off saving for retirement than not.  To the extent 
regulatory changes are warranted, they should be directed at 
enabling plan participants to navigate the retirement planning 
process more effectively, not penalizing employers for respond-
ing to financial illiteracy in an imperfect manner.  Accordingly, 
we argue that mandated employer-based literacy education 
rather than heightened employer liability is the appropriate 
response to financial illiteracy, a response that we develop in 
the next section. 
B. Formalizing the Employer’s Role in Evaluating and 
Remediating Financial Illiteracy by Plan 
Participants 
Existing levels of financial literacy undermine the theory of 
participant choice upon which ERISA’s current approach to 
defined contribution plans is based.  Our data show that a 
substantial percentage of plan participants are financially illit-
erate and that, in a sense, many participants are victims of a 
regulatory structure that requires them to manage critical deci-
sions regarding retirement planning without preparing them to 
make those decisions competently.  The solution, we suggest, 
is for ERISA or the Department of Labor to mandate financial 
education, as a component of employer provided defined con-
tribution plans. 
1. The Importance of Financial Literacy for Appropriate 
Retirement Savings and Investment 
Research on financial literacy points to the importance of 
financial knowledge for savvy investment and other behavior. 
Many studies, not just in the United States but around the 
world, show there is a strong effect of financial literacy both on 
whether individuals invest in stocks127 and on the return they 
earn on their portfolios; those who are more financially literate 
are more likely to invest in the stock market and to earn a 
127 See generally Joanne Yoong, Financial Illiteracy and Stock Market Partici-
pation: Evidence from the RAND American Life Panel, in FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 76 (Olivia S. Mitchell 
& Annamaria Lusardi eds., 2011) (discussing relationship between financial liter-
acy and stock market participation). 
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higher rate of return, controlling for risk.128  Financial literacy 
also affects portfolio choices; those who are more financially 
literate are more likely to invest in ways that minimize fees and 
avoid extreme positions (for example investing 0% or 100% of 
their portfolio in risky assets, such as stocks or stock mutual 
funds).129 
Financial literacy is also linked to responsible behavior re-
lated to retirement savings. Specifically, those who are more 
financially literate are more likely to plan for retirement.130 
This is consequential for retirement savings because those who 
plan for retirement accumulate two to three times more wealth 
than nonplanners.131  Those who are more financially literate 
are also less likely to withdraw from their retirement accounts, 
making it more likely that employees get to retirement with 
higher amounts of retirement savings.132 
Financial literacy is also linked not only to long-term sav-
ings, but to short-term savings as well, such as precautionary 
savings which increases an investor’s ability to face a financial 
shock.  For example, those who are more financially literate are 
more likely to be able to come up with money if an unexpected 
shock were to hit, and less likely to rely on borrowing, includ-
ing tapping into their retirement accounts.133 
Financial literacy is linked to another important aspect of 
behavior, i.e., debt and debt management.  This is important 
because, as mentioned above, retirement savings and debt are 
found to be closely linked, and those who have more retirement 
savings also have more debt.  Recent research shows that those 
who are less financially literate are more likely to carry debt 
close to retirement when, in fact, people should be close to the 
128 See Robert Clark et al., Financial Knowledge and 401(k) Investment Per-
formance: A Case Study, 16 J.  PENSION ECON. & FIN. 324, 357 (2017). 
129 See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 5, at 637 (using experimental evidence to 
show that “financially illiterate investors allocate too little money to equity, engage 
in naive diversification, fail to identify dominated funds, and are inattentive to 
fees.” (footnote omitted)). 
130 See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 6, at 518. 
131 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning: Im-
plications for Retirement Well-Being, in FINANCIAL LITERACY, supra note 127, at 17. 
132 See Ashley Ann Tharayil & William B. Walstad, The Effect of Financial 
Literacy on Withdrawing Funds Intended for Retirement—Conclusions Drawn 
from Three Years of Data 15–18 (Jan. 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (Am. 
Econ. Ass’n Paper Session). 
133 See ANDREA HASLER, ANNAMARIA LUSARDI & NOEMI OGGERO, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 
IN THE US: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 9–10 (Apr. 2018), https://gflec.org/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2018/04/Financial-Fragility-Research-Paper-04-16-2018-Final. 
pdf?x37292 [https://perma.cc/GQ58-WVTN]. 
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peak of their wealth accumulation.134  Most importantly, finan-
cial illiteracy is found to be closely linked to poor debt manage-
ment, such as behavior associated with paying high interest 
costs, fees and going over pre-set borrowing limits.135  It has 
also been associated with using high-cost methods of borrow-
ing, such as relying on payday loans or using pawn shops, 
methods that charge interest rates often well above 100%.136 
It is certainly difficult to distinguish causality from correla-
tion, and one can argue that both financial literacy and active 
investing are the products of individual investor choice; in 
other words, individuals can invest in both knowledge and fi-
nancial assets.  However, studies that have addressed the is-
sue of causality have shown not only that the causality runs 
from financial literacy to financial behavior (rather than the 
other way around), but also that the original estimates that did 
not account for the endogeneity of financial literacy may have 
led to an underestimation of the effects of financial literacy on 
saving, investment, and planning behavior.137  Simply stated, 
it is hard to imagine that ignorance is bliss when it comes to 
investment, and that employees could get to the right invest-
ment for them without having any knowledge of the basic prin-
ciples of finance.  And financial ignorance, in particular of the 
concepts related to investment decisions, is well documented in 
all of the studies we have reviewed. 
Empirical estimates notwithstanding, theoretical models of 
saving also highlight the critical importance of financial liter-
acy.  If, as empirical studies show, financial literacy allows in-
dividuals to participate in financial markets and earn a higher 
rate of return on their investments than nonliterate individu-
als, the effects on retirement savings are very consequential. 
According to the estimates of Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell, 
financial literacy can account for 30 to 40% of the inequality of 
retirement savings as employees approach retirement.138 
134 See Annamaria Lusardi et al., The Changing Face of Debt and Financial 
Fragility at Older Ages, 108 AM. ECON. ASS’N  PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 407, 407 
(2018). 
135 See Lusardi & Tufano, supra note 101, at 349. 
136 See Annamaria Lusardi & Carlo de Bassa Scheresberg, Financial Literacy 
and High-Cost Borrowing in the United States 12–14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 18969, 2013). 
137 See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 3, at 27. 
138 Annamaria Lusardi et al., Optimal Financial Knowledge and Wealth Ine-
quality, 125 J. POL. ECON. 431, 433 (2017). 
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2. The Role of Financial Education in Improving Financial 
Literacy 
Another way to understand the importance of financial lit-
eracy is to examine the effects of programs designed to boost 
financial knowledge.  Several states in the United States have 
made financial literacy mandatory in high school.139  Financial 
education programs are also provided in colleges and universi-
ties140 and the workplace.141 
Measuring the effectiveness of financial education pro-
grams is complex because a number of confounding factors 
can affect how participants respond to these programs.142  For 
example, selection issues may confound the results—those 
who attend may be disproportionately motivated or, alterna-
tively, the least financially literate.  One way of addressing 
these issues is through randomized controlled trials (RCT), 
which are considered the gold standard of evaluations.143 
Early studies found limited effects from financial education 
programs, leading some to conclude that there was no value to 
financial education.144  In some cases this might have been due 
to the details of the programs, which often cannot be assessed, 
139 According to the most recent Council for Economic Education’s Survey of 
the States, seventeen states require high school students to take a course in 
personal finance. COUNCIL FOR ECON. EDUC., SURVEY OF THE STATES, ECONOMIC AND 
PERSONAL FINANCE IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS (2018), http://www.councilforeconed. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2018-SOS-Layout-18.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GY4P-DKV5]. 
140 See, e.g., Ted Beck, How to Help Colleges Teach Financial Literacy, WALL ST. 
J. (Aug. 6, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2017/08/06/how-to-help-col 
leges-teach-financial-literacy/ [https://perma.cc/TNR9-HPXY] (observing that 
“[n]ow there are literally hundreds of institutions taking responsibility” for finan-
cial education). 
141 See, e.g., Chloe Skaar, More Companies Are Offering Financial Education for 
Employees, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 28, 2018, 6:44 PM), https://www.dispatch. 
com/business/20180628/more-companies-are-offering-financial-education-for-
employees [https://perma.cc/HC2X-NQGB] (reporting that employers are in-
creasingly offering financial education programs to their employees). 
142 See Justine S. Hastings, Brigitte C. Madrian & William L. Skimmyhorn, 
Financial Literacy, Financial Education and Economic Outcomes, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 
347, 359–61 (2013) (observing that the existing literature on the effects of finan-
cial education programs is mixed and inconclusive and that “this literature needs 
additional large-scale randomized interventions designed to effectively identify 
causal effects”). 
143 See, e.g., Tim Kaiser & Lukas Menkhoff, Does Financial Education Impact 
Financial Literacy and Financial Behavior, and if So, When?, 31 WORLD BANK ECON. 
REV. 611, 615–17 (2017) (observing that studies involving RCTs show highly sig-
nificant effects of financial education on financial behavior). 
144 See Daniel Fernandes, John G. Lynch Jr. & Richard G. Netemeyer, Finan-
cial Literacy, Financial Education, and Downstream Financial Behaviors, 60 MGMT. 
SCI. 1861, 1862 (2014). 
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because the majority of studies lack specific program informa-
tion about, for example, quality of the material, program inten-
sity, and teacher training.145  In addition, studies often 
aggregated the results across the entire group of participants 
without considering the possibility that the programs could 
have affected particular groups differently, such as those who 
were the least financially literate.  A recent comprehensive 
meta-analysis of the effects of financial education shows that 
not only do financial education programs work, but also that 
the details of the programs matter substantially.146 
Recent work on financial education also shows that imple-
mentation is critically important.147  For example, financial ed-
ucation in school is found to be most effective when financial 
education is a required course with a rigorous curriculum and 
where the teachers are trained to teach financial literacy.148 
While these findings are hardly surprising, they confirm that 
evaluations of the effect of financial education need to be rigor-
ous and take into account the characteristics and quality of the 
program as well as the well-documented differences in financial 
literacy across demographic groups.  The importance of finan-
cial literacy in school is also confirmed by the mounting evi-
dence that is now emerging around the world; many studies 
have found similar and even stronger effects of financial educa-
tion in school in other countries.149  Further indirect evidence 
of its importance is that, since 2012, the OECD has added 
financial literacy to the topics it measures in its Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), assessing the readi-
ness of high school students around the world.150 
145 See, e.g., Wendy L. Way & Karen C. Holden, Teachers’ Background and 
Capacity to Teach Personal Finance: Results of a National Study, 20 J. FIN. COUN-
SELING & PLAN. 64, 66–75 (2009) (examining data from more than 1,200 K–12 
teachers, prospective teachers, and teacher education faculty representing four 
census regions and finding that fewer than one-fifth stated they were prepared to 
teach personal finance). 
146 See Kaiser & Menkhoff, supra note 143, at 626–28. 
147 Carly Urban, Maximilian Schmeiser, J. Michael Collins & Alexandra 
Brown, State Financial Education Mandates: It’s All in the Implementation, FINRA 
INV. EDU. FOUND. (Jan. 2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/inves-
toreducationfoundation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9535-APWY]. 
148 Carly Urban et al., The Effects of High School Personal Financial Education 
Policies on Financial Behavior, ECON. EDUC. REV. (2018), https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.econedurev.2018.03.006 [https://perma.cc/U8PE-9WNV]. 
149 Verónica Frisancho, The Impact of School-Based Financial Education on 
High School Students and Their Teachers: Experimental Evidence from Peru 3–4 
(Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 871, 2018). 
150 Launch: OECD PISA Financial Literacy Assessment of Students, ORG. ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-education/ 
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Some studies have assessed the effectiveness of financial 
education in the workplace.  Studies here are more heterogene-
ous, and many programs have not been evaluated or evaluated 
rigorously, but the existing evidence shows that financial edu-
cation in the workplace holds much promise.151  In the follow-
ing subpart we elaborate from the research findings and our 
own experience working with both firms and financial market 
regulators to offer some initial components of an effective em-
ployer-provided financial education program. 
3. Key Components of Employer-Provided Financial 
Education 
The existing research points to three components of an 
effective employer-provided financial education program that 
could be implemented by all employers: (1) a self-assessment, 
(2) minimum requirements about the content of programs, and 
(3) timing—when the program and components of the pro-
grams should be provided. 
Starting with the first, we recommend that employers be 
required to provide a self-assessment enabling their employees 
to measure their financial knowledge and capability.  We now 
have validated ways to measure financial literacy—a set of 
questions has been tested in many national surveys and has 
provided robust findings.152  An assessment can serve several 
purposes; it could be the first step toward segmenting workers 
into different types of financial education programs targeted to 
different needs and different levels of financial knowledge.  It 
could also provide a simple way for both employer and employ-
ees to be informed and track progress over time.  A self-assess-
ment also makes it possible for those who can demonstrate 
financial knowledge to opt out of simple programs or partici-
pate only in parts of the program.  Self-assessments could ex-
tend to financial behavior, in addition to financial knowledge, 
and become a financial check-up that employees can take to 
assess the state of their finances on a regular basis. 
launch-pisa-financial-literacy-students-2017.htm [https://perma.cc/KR39-
K44Z]. 
151 See Kaiser & Menkhoff, supra note 143, at 612 (providing meta-analysis of 
126 studies of financial education and concluding that the studies are highly 
heterogeneous but generally support the idea that financial education, including 
education done in the workplace, can be effective). 
152 Some large firms are already using financial literacy questions, such as the 
Big Three, to measure financial knowledge among their employees. See Lusardi & 
Mitchell, supra note 94, at 498–99. 
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Second, as for the program content, the Department of 
Labor could introduce minimum requirements as to what 
should be included in a program to provide the working knowl-
edge and skills necessary to navigate the defined contribution 
system.153  These requirements could include both specific in-
formation about the 401(k) plan, the investment options con-
tained in that plan, and the process of saving and investing for 
retirement.  They could also extend to more general compo-
nents of personal financial decision-making that contribute to 
an employee’s financial well-being. 
Academic research indicates that effective financial educa-
tion programs should extend beyond retirement savings or in-
vesting,154 because poor financial decisions of all kinds can 
influence retirement savings both directly and indirectly.  For 
example, an employee’s decision to purchase a house or auto-
mobile and to incur debt in connection with that purchase can 
affect how much that employee can contribute to a retirement 
account, because debt is one of the most important reasons 
why employees do not contribute to supplementary retirement 
accounts.155  Given the cost and prevalence of high cost bor-
rowing and the potential mismanagement of debt, programs 
that include debt and debt management can be particularly 
important.  Moreover, lack of precautionary savings may lead 
individuals to tap into retirement accounts prematurely when 
they experience financial shocks, making it important for edu-
cation programs to promote both long-term and short-term 
savings.156 
The existing research shows that there are many ways in 
which financial education can be provided, for example 
through on-line programs, videos, or live sessions, either in 
individualized or group formats.157  These programs are often 
153 The P-Fin Index illustrates the eight areas of working knowledge and what 
employees know the least. PAUL J. YAKOBOSKI, ANNAMARIA LUSARDI & ANDREA HAS-
LER, THE 2018 TIAA INSTITUTE-GFLEC PERSONAL FINANCE INDEX, THE STATE OF FINAN-
CIAL  LITERACY  AMONG U.S. ADULTS 1 (Apr. 2018), https://gflec.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/04/TIAA_GFLEC_Report_PFinIndex_April2018_fin.pdf?x98192 
[https://perma.cc/BR5W-YXQK]. 
154 See Hastings et al., supra note 142, at 358. 
155 See Rajashri Chakrabarti et al., Household Debt and Saving During the 
2007 Recession 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16999, 
2011), https://www.nber.org/papers/w16999.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5UB-
GCMW] (explaining that those who decreased net contributions to their retirement 
accounts were motivated to reduce debt). 
156 About one-third of Americans could not come up with $2,000 in a month, if 
they were to face an unexpected need. HASLER ET AL., supra note 133, at 3. 
157 Aileen Heinberg et al., Five Steps to Planning Success: Experimental Evi-
dence from U.S. Households, 30 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 697, 699–701 (2014). 
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simple, yet effective and not costly.  For example, initiatives like 
those described in the Five Steps to Planning Success, which 
teaches the basics of financial planning in short videos, have 
been found to have an effect on financial knowledge.158  Re-
search also shows that some topics, such as risk and risk 
diversification, are particularly hard for employees to grasp,159 
but that simple tools that help people visualize and simplify the 
workings of risk and risk diversification have an effect on finan-
cial knowledge.160 
In addition, programs can be made more effective if tailored 
to the needs of specific employees.  For example, young work-
ers may benefit from programs covering student loans and 
buying the first home.  Women may benefit from programs 
about investing and saving for the long term.161  Older workers 
may benefit from programs about Social Security, when it is 
best to withdraw Social Security benefits, and the workings of 
annuities.  Older workers may also benefit from programs spe-
cially focused on retirement planning such as financial calcula-
tors that demonstrate the impact of withdrawals from 401(k) 
plans on projected retirement security over time. 
Studies also show that employees are demanding financial 
education and view the provision of financial education in the 
workplace positively.162  For many, workplace-provided pro-
grams are the only source of financial education to which they 
are exposed.  Even so, employee motivation to participate in 
financial education programs can be increased through incen-
tives.163  Employers can offer employees financial incentives for 
participating in education programs, performance-based in-
centives such as rewards for success on tests of financial liter-
158 Id. at 708–15. 
159 See YAKOBOSKI ET AL., supra note 153, at 1 (discussing a personal finance 
index as a robust measure of overall personal finance knowledge and a nuanced 
analysis of knowledge across different areas of personal finance in which individu-
als inherently function). 
160 Annamaria Lusardi et al., Visual Tools and Narratives: New Ways to Im-
prove Financial Literacy, 16 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 297, 312–15 (2015). 
161 As shown earlier, women are those more likely to be passive investors. See 
supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
162 Rebecca Estrada, Best Practices for Workplace Financial Education, INT’L 
FOUND. EMP. BENEFIT  PLANS (Sept. 12, 2018), https://blog.ifebp.org/index.php/ 
financial-education-workplace-best-practices [https://perma.cc/85M2-PCAL]. 
163 See generally Providing Incentives for Your Employee Financial Wellness 
Program, ENRICH (July 17, 2018), https://www.enrich.org/blog/employee-finan-
cial-wellness-program-incentives [https://perma.cc/5M8M-YRME] (describing 
potential incentives to increase employee use of workplace financial education 
programs). 
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acy, as well as rewards for demonstrating healthy financial 
behaviors over time. 
Importantly, an employer-provided financial education 
program should be independent in the sense that it should not 
steer employees to a particular investment option (particularly 
one that provides fees to the sponsor or source of the education 
program).164  It is also important to make sure that programs 
teach or enable employees to make financial decisions, rather 
than preach what is suitable behavior, according to the em-
ployer’s perspective.165 
Third, timing of financial education programs has been 
shown to be extremely important.166  For example, programs 
could be provided at the critical moments when financial deci-
sions are made, such as the beginning of employment, at sepa-
ration, at the time of promotion, or when benefits and health 
benefits are reviewed (normally on a yearly basis).  Timing of 
the programs addresses several of the issues that have been 
linked to the effectiveness of financial education, for example 
the fact that knowledge may decline with time167 and that edu-
cation is most effective when it is provided at the time that 
people have to make decisions. 
While recent research shows that many employers have an 
interest in providing financial education to their employees,168 
the programs that are offered vary significantly.  This creates 
164 See Michael Kitces, Financial Literacy Effectiveness & Providing Just-In-
Time Training By Financial Advisors, KITCES (Sept. 21, 2016, 7:01 AM) https:// 
www.kitces.com/blog/financial-literacy-program-effectiveness-just-in-time-
training-by-financial-advisors/ [https://perma.cc/F9WN-ND9L] (observing that 
“a significant problem with the idea of just-in-time financial education is that it 
will often rely on the company providing the product or service to deliver it”). 
165 See Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim, & Annamaria Lusardi, A 
Method for Evaluating the Quality of Financial Decision Making, with an Applica-
tion to Financial Education 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 20618, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20618.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/UV7W-5XXK]. 
166 See, e.g., Karina Harley, The Effects of ‘Just in Time’ Financial Education 
Programs on Financial Literacy and Economic Decision-Making in Superannua-
tion 1, 86–87 (2017) (unpublished thesis, Wirtschaftsuniversitat Wien), http:// 
47ctca2fz6ha46w1l826tujxm5k.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/15/2017/05/Harley-Thesis_Impact-of-just-in-time-financial-edu-
cation-intervention-on-superannuant-decision-making.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8Z2F-C87P] (describing the importance of providing financial education on a 
“just-in-time” basis). 
167 See id. at 12 (noting that “[t]here is a significant body of evidence to demon-
strate that financial literacy boosted by educational interventions diminishes over 
time”). 
168 See LORI LUCAS, EBRI’S 2018 EMPLOYER FINANCIAL WELLBEING SURVEY 1, 2–3 
(2018), https://www.ebri.org/docs/default-source/ebri-issue-brief/ebri_ib_466_ 
fwrcsur-29nov18.pdf?sfvrsn=bdb23e2f_6 [https://perma.cc/2ZRL-ZGKB]. 
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different opportunities for employees across firms, but it also 
means that a number of employers offer substandard programs 
or do not provide any financial education at all.169  Thus, our 
recommendation is for the Department of Labor both to man-
date employer-provided financial education and to issue a set 
of guidelines that govern what is considered an acceptable pro-
gram, along the same lines in which they have expressed judg-
ments on what are acceptable investment options. 
Additionally, guidelines on how to evaluate program success 
would assist employers in improving program effectiveness. 
One might ask why a mandate is necessary in light of the 
market-based trend toward providing workplace-based finan-
cial education.  We identify several advantages to a regulatory 
mandate.  First, it would ensure that all workers, not only 
those working in big firms or firms providing generous pension 
benefits, have access to financial education in the workplace. 
For many and, in particular, vulnerable groups, the workplace 
may be the only source of financial education.  Second, our 
proposal leaves room for firm-specific decisions about the de-
tails of their financial education, a mandate only sets a floor 
with respect to minimum standards.  Third, a regulatory man-
date encourages market-based innovation.  Existing research 
is still experimenting to develop what works best in financial 
education, and a regulatory requirement provides an incentive 
for third party providers to invest in this area.  Mandates can 
also bolster the exchange of information and experience across 
firms, improving the supply and quality of programs over time 
and their effectiveness in addressing the needs of workers.170 
Finally, a requirement that applies to all firms is necessary 
to address worker mobility.  Many workers change jobs during 
their working career.  In the same way in which defined benefit 
plans were not an adequate pension system in a dynamic labor 
market, defined contribution plans that do not take into con-
sideration the different needs of workers are not adequate for 
the current labor force.  Using shortcuts to compensate for the 
absence of informed participant choice, such as automatic en-
rollment or default investment options, is particularly problem-
169 See id. at 12–14. 
170 We note that employers rarely share the details of their programs, although 
such information is potentially quite valuable to assist others in designing an 
effective program.  For an example, see Dara Duguay, Making Financial Education 
Work in the Workplace, FED. RES. BANK OF  MINN. (Apr. 1, 2011), https:// 
www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/community-dividend/making-financial-
education-work-in-the-workplace-the-citigroup-experience [https://perma.cc/ 
4PED-4TE9]. 
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atic if employees stay with the same employer for a short period 
of time only.  Default options do not address the knowledge 
required to make decisions about how to transfer retirement 
savings or to manage retirement savings when making job 
transitions. 
Furthermore, the fact that inadequate retirement savings 
and poor investing will require taxpayers to make up for these 
mistakes, strengthens the case for mandates.  Note that these 
are soft mandates; they do not require individuals to save or 
invest a specific amount; rather they provide the individuals 
with the skills to make the decisions that the new pension 
system requires from them. 
In addition, although requiring that employers provide fi-
nancial education is a burden, employers will also benefit from 
financial education programs because they will increase the 
value of the benefits programs that they provide to their em-
ployees.  In turn, this will assist employers in recruiting and 
retaining employees.  In addition, employers obtain value from 
worker financial wellbeing because troubling financial situa-
tions can affect employees’ performance at work.171  While 
these benefits offer employers incentives to implement finan-
cial education programs voluntarily, making such programs 
mandatory will ensure that all workers can be exposed to fi-
nancial education. 
In summary, as studies of financial education programs 
have become methodologically rigorous, they have developed 
evidence that financial education offers much promise in ad-
dressing financial illiteracy and poor financial decision-mak-
ing.  Financial education programs are not only a step forward 
when looking at measures to equip employees to manage their 
own retirement accounts and invest their retirement savings 
but also a necessary requirement if the objective of defined 
contribution pensions is to promote financial security and 
make employees save adequately for their retirement.  Further, 
if insufficient retirement funds strain the welfare system and, 
at the end, affect taxpayers, it is important to find ways to 
reach as large a share of employees as possible. 
171 See, e.g., Kyle Sanders, Is it Time to Offer Financial Education as a Benefit?, 
EMP. BENEFIT  ADVISOR (Dec. 1, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.employeebenefit 
adviser.com/opinion/is-it-time-to-offer-financial-education-as-a-benefit [https:/ 
/perma.cc/ZNE7-6YB2] (reporting that a substantial number of employees suffer 
from serious financial stress that interferes with their performance at work). 
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CONCLUSION 
The structure of U.S. retirement savings has evolved to rely 
critically on active participation and informed choices by par-
ticipants in employer-sponsored 401(k) plans.  In this Article, 
we present new evidence that this structure has introduced a 
substantial number of people to the financial markets whose 
only contact with those markets is their 401(k) plan and that 
these workplace-only investors are both different from other 
investors and largely unprepared to make responsible savings 
and investment decisions.  Despite the limited financial literacy 
of workplace-only investors, the existing regulatory structure 
largely defers to employee choice to limit the responsibility of 
employers for the appropriateness of those decisions. 
We challenge this approach, concluding from our empirical 
analysis that workplace-only investors are too vulnerable to 
take sole responsibility for their current and future financial 
well-being.  We identify two possible regulatory responses: im-
posing greater responsibility on plan sponsors to oversee the 
quality of employees’ retirement investing or requiring employ-
ers to evaluate and remediate the financial literacy of plan par-
ticipants through investor education.  We conclude that the 
latter approach is more promising and call for the Department 
of Labor to require employer-sponsored financial education. 
The financial landscape and labor markets that employees face 
today have changed substantially.  It is time to change the 
regulatory framework to equip workers with the knowledge and 
skills they need to make informed decisions about their pen-
sions in the twenty-first century. 
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Appendix: 
TABLE A1: Comparison of the General Populations Including 
“Do Not Know” (DNK) Responses with the General 
Population Excluding DNK Responses. 
(1) (2) 
Variables General General 
(weighted mean) population population 
incl. DNK excl. DNK 
Big Three correct 0.3054 0.3280 
Risk diversification 0.4416 0.4669 
Asset/Bond pricing 0.2571 0.2748 
Interest comp. 0.3293 0.3416 
Mortgage 0.7512 0.7674 
Inflation 0.5631 0.5825
Gender
Male 0.4929 0.5072 
Female 0.5071 0.4928 
Ethnicity 
White  0.6304 0.6341 
Black 0.1197 0.1216 
Hispanic 0.1690 0.1661 
Asian 0.0569 0.0552 
Other 0.0239 0.0230 
Age 
25–34 years 0.2996 0.2915
35–49 years 0.3990 0.3973 
50–60 years 0.3014 0.3111 
Income 
Below $25,000 0.2090 0.2185
$25,000–$49,000 0.2517 0.2447 
$50,000–$99,000 0.3508 0.3415
Over $100,000 0.1885  0.1953 
Education 
High school or less  0.2670 0.2628 
Some college 0.4257 0.4265
College graduate or above  0.3074 0.3107 
Marital status
Married 0.5657 0.5515
Single, not married 0.3028 0.3109 
Divorced or separated 0.1161 0.1213 
Widowed 0.0155  0.0163 
Employment 
Employed (full, part time) 0.6315  0.6379 
Self-employed 0.0832 0.0863 
Unemployed 0.0764 0.0787 
Not in the labor force  0.2089 0.1971 
Observations  16,793 14,640 
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Source: 2015 National Financial Capability Study. 
Note: Sample restricted to non-retired individuals age 25–60; all estimates are 
weighted. The Big Three financial literacy measure is a dummy variable with value 
1 if the respondent answered the interest, inflation, and risk diversification ques-
tions correctly. Income brackets report household annual income from all 
sources, such as wages, tips, investment income, public assistance, and retire-
ment plans. 
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DATA APPENDIX. 
The National Financial Capability Study (NFCS) is the first 
and only survey providing detailed information about financial 
literacy and financial capability in the United States. The sur-
vey, which is supported by FINRA Financial Education Foun-
dation, started in 2009 and is conducted every three years. One 
of the authors of this paper (Lusardi) has been the academic 
advisor of the survey since its inception and has participated in 
the design of the NFCS’s questionnaire — in particular the 
parts related to measuring financial literacy and personal fi-
nance management. The survey is representative of the U.S. 
population, and the data, since 2012, is collected online only. 
One of the important features of the data is the large number of 
observations, more than 27,000, which make it possible to 
study not just the total population but also specific subgroups, 
such as those who invest in retirement and other accounts. 
To construct our sample, we used data from the latest wave 
of the survey, 2015.  We restricted the sample to non-retired 
respondents in the age group 25–60 to avoid respondents who 
are still in school or those very close to retirement or retiring. 
We distinguish between different types of investors based on 
the questions listed below: 
C1) Do you or your [spouse/partner] have any retirement plans 
through a current or previous employer, like a pension plan, a 
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), or a 401(k)? 
[Yes; No; Don’t know; Prefer not to say] 
C3) Are any of these retirement plans the kind where you or 
your [spouse/partner] get to choose how the money is 
invested? 
[Yes, No, Don’t know, Prefer not to say] 
C4) Do you or your [spouse/partner] have any other retirement 
accounts NOT through an employer, like an IRA, Keogh, SEP, 
myRA, or any other type of retirement account that you have 
set up yourself? 
[Yes, No, Don’t know, Prefer not to say] 
B14) Not including retirement accounts, does your household 
have any investments in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, or other 
securities? 
[Yes, No, Don’t know, Prefer not to say] 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN302.txt unknown Seq: 55 10-AUG-20 12:10
795 2020] DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN 
The answers to C4 are used to identify participants who 
have set up their own retirement accounts (active investors in 
retirement savings). The answer to B14 are used to identify 
participants who have private investments other than or in 
addition to retirement accounts (active investors in financial 
markets). We used the answers to the first two questions 
(C1and C3) and also to C4 and B14 to determine workplace-
only investors, i.e., they are those who have a retirement plan 
through their employer where they get to choose how the 
money is invested but do not have any other retirement ac-
counts or other financial investments in stocks, bonds, mutual 
funds and other securities (workplace-only investors). 
To construct these definitions of investors, we delete the 
“do not know” and “prefer not to say” responses to questions 
C3, C4, and B14,172 as otherwise a clear classification would 
not have been possible. In some cases, this has the effect of 
dropping a sizable number of observations, in particular when 
looking at the responses to C3 (7% of the total working age 
population). This is mostly due to the frequency of “do not 
know” responses. This can be considered additional evidence of 
the lack of knowledge and information of individuals, in partic-
ular when it comes to retirement accounts. In total, we drop 
2,153 observations. In Table A1, we report the demographics 
and average financial literacy levels of the general population 
with both including and excluding the “do not know re-
sponses”. Overall, we do not find much evidence of selectivity 
when focusing on the sample without the “do not know” 
responses. 
We report below the list of financial literacy questions 
available in the 2015 NFCS. The Big Three financial literacy 
questions refer to M6, M7 and M10. 
M6) Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the inter-
est rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think 
you would have in the account if you left the money to grow? 
[More than $102; Exactly $102; Less than $102; Don’t know; 
Prefer not to say] 
M7) Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 
1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how 
172 We do not exclude the ‘do not know” and “prefer not to say” answers from 
question C1 because question C3, that we use in the definition of workplace-only 
investors, is only asked to the respondents answering “yes” to question C1. 
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much would you be able to buy with the money in this 
account? 
[More than today; Exactly the same; Less than today; Don’t 
know; Prefer not to say] 
M8) If interest rates rise, what will typically happen to bond 
prices? 
[They will rise; They will fall; They will stay the same; There is 
no relationship between bond prices and the interest rate; 
Don’t know; Prefer not to say] 
M31) Suppose you owe $1,000 on a loan and the interest rate 
you are charged is 20% per year compounded annually. If you 
didn’t pay anything off, at this interest rate, how many years 
would it take for the amount you owe to double? 
[Less than 2 years; At least 2 years but less than 5 years; At 
least 5 years but less than 10 years; At least 10 years; Don’t 
know; Prefer not to say] 
M9) A 15-year mortgage typically requires higher monthly pay-
ments than a 30-year mortgage, but the total interest paid over 
the life of the loan will be less. 
[True; False; Don’t know; Prefer not to say] 
M10) Buying a single company’s stock usually provides a safer 
return than a stock mutual fund. 
[True; False; Don’t know; Prefer not to say] 
